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C
ommunity-driven development is indelible in the development landscape. It is increas-
ingly visible in the policy design of many governments, nongovernmental organizations,
and multilateral institutions and features in important debates involving democracy,
governance, institutions, and decentralization. As this research report points out, this has philo-
sophical and instrumentalist underpinnings, with participation as both means and end. Participa-
tory or community-driven development is advocated on the basis that, among other advantages,
it can reduce information problems for development planners and beneficiaries, increase the
resources available to poor people, and strengthen the capacity for collective action among
poor and other marginalized societal groups.
While these arguments are persuasive, there is a need to scrutinize the benefits of partici-
pation more closely, along with the complex operational problems inherent in participa-
tory approaches. The unique contribution of this study—which derives from IFPRI’s research
programs on targeted safety net programs, policy processes, and governance—is threefold.
First, it examines an innovation in public works programs designed to achieve multiple de-
velopment objectives, from job creation to community empowerment; second, it uses a unique,
project-level quantitative dataset and econometric analysis to uncover hard evidence of the
effects of different forms of participation on key outcomes of a safety net program; and, third,
it uses rich case study data to explain a range of ways in which participation can affect the out-
comes of public works programs. The report also explores the complexities of institutional
arrangements and policy processes involving government, the private sector, and community-
based organizations representing a diverse and often conflicting set of values, identities, and
interests. Such an understanding of the policy process is key to understanding why policies
succeed or fail in achieving the expected results. 
The study finds that community participation does lead to improved project outcomes, but
it is not an easy road to travel. The authors point out that participation does not have to be all
or nothing, and its best forms are likely to vary under different conditions. Different modali-
ties exist that can capture local preferences, achieve accountability and transparency, and build
capacity and local empowerment, while at the same time delivering the quality infrastructure
needed by the poor. However, while the research has shown convergence between diverse
program objectives, policymakers will also have to resolve trade-offs by weighing economic
and social priorities. Furthermore, the research shows that policy processes do not end with
policymaking—decisions must be supported by solid commitments and institutional arrange-
ments that enable agreements to be carried out and monitored. 
While many of the findings of this study are specific to the South African context, many
of the issues confronted are common to the challenges of participation, community-driven de-
velopment, scaling up, and policy processes encountered across the globe. The report provides
research methods and insights for researchers, policymakers, and development practitioners
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ixSummary
F
ollowing South Africa’s democratic transition in 1994, the new government launched
public works programs that shared four objectives: to create jobs to respond to ex-
tremely high levels of poverty and unemployment; to build or rehabilitate infrastruc-
ture in poor, underserved areas, or improve the natural environment; to provide job training
that would enable workers to find postproject employment; and finally to build the capacity
of communities to control their own development processes through community participation
in public works projects.  
The long national struggle for democracy, combined with exposure to democracy in for-
eign institutions and in trade unions and civic associations within South Africa, infused the
country’s new leadership and many of its constituencies with a broad democratic agenda—
from “one person, one vote” to control of local development projects by elected community-
based organizations. At the same time, South Africa’s history of political conflict, including
extreme racial and class polarization and violent political strife, meant that attempts to create
democratic institutions would not be easily or wholly achieved. A national public works pro-
gram, which distributed resources to reduce poverty while building capacity and promoting
participation by local institutions, would be no exception: it involved actors who had only re-
cently emerged from the apartheid system, under which they had experienced a vast political,
economic, social, and cultural divide. 
Through a study of seven public works programs implemented in Western Cape province,
this report examines the benefits and challenges of pursuing community participation, together
with the effects of participation on meeting the other objectives of the programs. Although
aspects of South Africa’s experience are unique to its political economy, the study’s findings
reveal insights, dilemmas, and possibilities of considerable relevance in the wider context of
participatory or “community-driven” development programs, which have increasingly become
integral to the development agenda throughout the world. 
The extent to which public works programs achieve their objectives depends on institu-
tions at several levels and their performance based on access to information, the incentives
they face, and the requirements of a changing political, social, and economic environment.
Thus this study considers key institutions, their agents, and their interrelationships in the im-
plementation of public works projects. This coverage includes the intended and actual responsi-
bilities of community-based committees; the advantages and disadvantages of community par-
ticipation in different aspects of project selection, design, and management; the effects of
community participation on project performance; and the factors that prevent community-based
committees from acting in the capacity intended in policy documents. Key to understanding
these constraints is the relationship of community organizations to other project-level actors
in government and the private sector, and the changes in professional identity, institutional
practices, and local politics necessary for communities to receive the type of opportunities
envisioned.
The report integrates quantitative and qualitative data from a survey of 101 public works
projects with in-depth qualitative data from eight project-level case studies. The quantitative
xanalysis examines the outcomes of different forms of participation on job creation, labor in-
tensity, efficiency in transferring income to the poor, and other variables. It finds that, even
after accounting for the endogeneity of participation, de facto participation has a statistically
significant, positive effect on the share of the project budget spent on labor, the log number of
days of work created, and the log number of training days undertaken. It increases women’s
share of employment and is associated with a reduction in the ratio of the project wage to local
unskilled wages. It also reduces the cost of creating employment and of transferring income
to the poor. The magnitudes of these impacts are sizeable and robust to a variety of model
specifications and the inclusion of other covariates. 
The case studies indicate the ways in which different forms of participation added value to
projects by enabling beneficiary communities to influence the choices of priority assets and
project design features, which increased safety and convenience and affected the number of
jobs created in the short and long terms. They also demonstrated the importance of regular
communication with communities to build a sense of local ownership, increasing cooperation
and the maintenance of assets. The case studies also show how community participation in-
troduces politics, conflict, and lengthier decisionmaking processes—as well as how lack of
participation can result in even more conflict and delays further down the line, when time
becomes more expensive.  
The study finds a wide gap between ideas for community-driven projects embodied in na-
tional government programs and the beliefs and practices of professional public and private
providers at provincial and local levels. Although consensus on the importance of community
participation has been voiced, there is also profound ambivalence about it, as well as widely
different ideas about what it means and where it is appropriate. Community-based committees
were involved in some way in almost all the projects, but their roles were often limited to com-
munity and worker liaison functions. Private-sector and local government project managers
excluded community participation from management tasks because of their views on effi-
ciency and specialization; their lack of identification with the programs’ capacity-building and
empowerment objectives, which were set at the national level; and ambiguities about the roles
of different stakeholders. Community committee members often did not have sufficient skills
and were not trained.  
One policy implication might be to reduce the role of communities to opportunities for
communication and some consultation. Local government, if downwardly accountable to poor
constituents, could manage public works projects. An alternative policy implication is that gov-
ernment should increase its commitment to improving structures and processes for commu-
nity participation for the value that it adds. Participation does not have to be all or nothing,
and its best forms are likely to vary under different circumstances. Where trade-offs between
the achievement of different program objectives are required, these must be weighed in light of
national and local priorities. If participation and local empowerment remain important objec-
tives, policymakers and program designers must creatively explore institutional arrangements
and methods for increasing local capacities. But new policy proposals alone are unlikely to
effect significant change. This would require involving influential government, private-sector,
and community stakeholders in the process; identifying common ground; and securing the
commitment necessary for agreements to be carried out and monitored. Politics, conflicts of
interest, struggles over resources, and processes of consultation and consensus-building are
part of the landscape of community-driven development. If participatory development is to re-
main on South Africa’s development agenda, all actors must commit to realizing this objective,
including generating sufficient resources, creativity, and patience to see the process through.
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Introduction
You see we consultants are used to the conventional way of working. We design, there’s
a contractor that is responsible, they are the communities or the beneficiaries—they
know nothing what is happening to the funds . . . They are just asked to work and get
salaries at the end of the day and leave. Now this situation is a new situation that needs
both parties, communities and the consultants, to make a joint effort to educate each
other about the new process because the whole process is new to us. The whole process
is new also to the community because they were not involved before. They were not
participating, so they want to participate.
Consulting engineer for the Thembaletu roads project
B
etween 1994 and 1995, six new public works programs were initiated by the new South
African national government, mainly administered by newly elected and transforming
provincial level governments. A seventh program was continued that had begun prior
to the 1994 election.1 These programs shared four objectives: First, to create jobs for the
poor and unemployed; second, to build or rehabilitate infrastructure, or to improve the natu-
ral environment; third, to provide job training that would enable workers to find post-project
employment; fourth, to build the capacity of communities to exert more control over their own
development processes, through strengthening local institutions and community participation
in public works projects. The nature and objectives of public works programs in South Africa
were shaped by three corresponding considerations: the high level of unemployment in South
Africa;2 the backlog in infrastructure such as roads, water, and sanitation systems in black
rural and urban areas; and the new government’s development philosophy that stressed sus-
tainability and democracy. Through a study of these seven programs as implemented in South
Africa’s Western Cape province, this report examines the benefits and challenges of attempt-
ing to achieve the fourth objective—community participation—and the effects of participation
on the programs’ability to meet their other objectives.
1The six programs were: The Clean and Green (CAG) and the Community Based Public Works (CBPWP), de-
veloped and financed by the National Department of Public Works (DPW); the Community Employment Pro-
gramme (CBPWP/CEP), part of the CBPWP administered by the Independent Development Trust (IDT); the
Transport Projects (Trans), funded by the national Department of Transport; the Working for Water Programme
(WWP) of the national Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF). The seventh program was the inter-
sectoral nongovernmental National Economic Forum (NEF) program begun in 1993.
2According to Klasen (1997) these were 30 percent of working age South Africans; 53 percent in the poorest
20 percent of households.
1Public works are widely used through-
out Asia, Africa, and Latin America for
poverty alleviation, social insurance, infra-
structure development at various levels of
labor intensity, or most commonly, all three
objectives (Subbarao et al. 1996; Subbarao
1997; Deolalikar 1995; von Braun, Teklu,
and Webb 1992; von Braun 1995). South
Africa’s programs share these objectives but
add those of sustainable job creation, insti-
tutional capacity building, and community
empowerment. The South African programs
are unusual in that they envisioned long-
term poverty alleviation—rather than a short-
term horizon most often held by public
works and other safety-net programs—by
attempting to generate skills that enhanced
people’s ability to secure employment after
the project has ended. The emphasis on
community participation was part of this
long-term horizon, the intention of which
was to develop community skills in organi-
zation and management to enable commu-
nities to access new development resources
and engage broader political processes.
Because community participation was
central to many aspects of the new gov-
ernment’s Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP), our study of public
works in the Western Cape province pro-
vides one window onto the broad develop-
mental changes and challenges faced by
South Africa since its transition to democ-
racy in 1994. At the same time, although
aspects of the South Africa experience are
unique to its political economy and to the
application of a participatory approach to
public works programs, this experience has
revealed insights, dilemmas, and possibil-
ities relevant to the wider context of partic-
ipatory or “community-driven” development
projects, which have become an increas-
ingly important part of the development
landscape.
The extent to which labor-intensive pub-
lic works programs achieve their objectives
depends on institutions at several levels, and
how these institutions perform in the con-
text of the information they have access to,
the incentives they face, and the changes
required by new program objectives and a
new political dispensation. Based on a study
of seven public works programs in Western
Cape province, this report thus looks at key
institutions, their role-players and their re-
lationships in the implementation of public
works projects. The primary emphasis is
on people in communities and community-
based project steering committees (PSCs).
This report examines the intended and
actual responsibilities of community-based
committees; the advantages and disadvan-
tages of community participation in differ-
ent aspects of project selection, design, and
management; outcomes of community par-
ticipation on project performance; and the
factors that have constrained the ability of
community-based committees to play the
role envisioned for them in policy docu-
ments. Key to understanding these con-
straints is the relationship of community or-
ganizations to other project-level actors in
government and the private sector, and the
changes in professional identity, institutional
practices, and local politics necessary if com-
munities are to receive the type of opportu-
nities envisioned. The research also looks at
outcomes, exploring how participation can
be an efficient means to achieving the pro-
grams’other material objectives. It revealed
tensions and trade-offs of different levels and
types of participation. Participation does not
have to be all or nothing, and good program
design choices adapt to different desires,
capacities and objectives. Where there are
trade-offs between the achievement of dif-
ferent program objectives, these must be
weighed in light of nationally and locally
defined priorities.
The rest of the report is organized in the
following manner. Chapter 2 provides a
background to the research, discussing sev-
eral inter-related aspects: some key ideas that
infuse much of the international literature
on participation in development, the politi-
cal and economic context in South Africa
that explains how community-based public
works got on the policy agenda, and a de-
2 CHAPTER 1scriptive overview of the seven national
public works programs that are included in
the research. It also provides the political
and economic context in Western Cape prov-
ince, which helps to explain the course of im-
plementation of the public works programs.
Chapter 3 describes the research design and
methods used in the quantitative and quali-
tative research. Chapter 4 focuses on one
of the core objectives of our work: to assess
whether community participation affects
project performance. To do so, we first set
out a conceptual model to capture some of
the analytics of participation. We use this
to help frame an econometric analysis of
project outcomes. Chapter 5 then introduces
eight case studies, which examine closely
what community participation actually looks
like in practice, and help to explain the re-
sults in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 first considers
certain key quantitative variables in the case
studies, including levels of participation and
performance outcomes of concern in the
quantitative analysis in order to show how
the case studies compare to the overall data-
set. Qualitative data are then used to explain
with depth the different forms that commu-
nity participation took in these projects, and
compare them to potential roles for inclu-
sive community-wide forums and for rep-
resentative community-based structures. We
discuss the advantages and drawbacks of
these different types of participation, from
forms of communication to participation in
project design and management, as well as
when and why people might not want to
participate. Continuing to use the case study
data, Chapter 6 then analyzes the social,
political, and institutional constraints on
meaningful participation, including beliefs
and practices of government and the private
sector with regard to project management,
specialization and efficiency, political con-
flict, and other issues. Chapter 7 draws some
conclusions about the need for the reclarifi-
cation or redefinition of program objectives
and about what would need to take place in
order to meet these objectives.
INTRODUCTION 3CHAPTER 2
Participatory Development and
the Origins of Community-Based
Public Works in South Africa
T
his chapter begins with an overview of the meaning of “participatory development,”
alternatively referred to in the literature as “community participation,” “community-
driven development,” and other terms. It then explains the historical, political, and eco-
nomic context in which community-based public works programs were conceived in South
Africa, including the conditions that led to a call for public employment programs and, in par-
ticular, those controlled by communities. It also details the institutional context for the devel-
opment of the seven programs included in the study, and describes each of these programs.
Finally, it discusses the conditions in the Western Cape province of South Africa, where we
conducted our research on public works programs.
Participatory development, where local people are engaged in some active way in develop-
ment planning and implementation, has a long history and a respected place among devel-
opment intellectuals, policymakers, and practitioners throughout the “first” and “third”
worlds.3 Participatory development, however, means very different things to different people:
from “local people doing what planners wanted” (Guijt 1991) to the “education for participa-
tion” approach of Paulo Freire where “men and women will analyze and critically interpret
their world and their problems, and will be able to acquire the skills necessary to respond to
them in a cooperative and democratic way” (OEF 1986 in McDonald 1995). It can involve
notions of individual empowerment as well as influencing wider processes of political change,
and even redefining the term “development” itself.
Support for participation has instrumentalist, philosophical, and political underpinnings.
The instrumentalist foundation involves a recognition that top-down, technocratic forms of
development imposed on diverse local realities often result in failure; that local people best
understand their own needs; and that involving local people can be cost-effective in terms of
reduced capital costs and increased involvement in operation and maintenance. The philo-
sophical-political foundation involves the belief that poor people should be empowered and
should have more command over their lives (Chambers 1995); and that they should be em-
powered “to determine choices in life and to influence the direction of change” (Moser
1989, 1815).
3For reviews of a wide range of philosophies and practices of participatory development, see Nelson and Wright
(1995) and Scoones and Thompson (1994). For additional perspectives see Rahman (1993), Long and Villarreal
(1993), and Rahnema (1992).
4In order to see how ideas about partici-
patory development made their way into
South African development policy, becom-
ing a centerpiece of public works programs,
it is important to understand the historical
political and economic conditions that char-
acterized the country in the period leading
up to and following the birth of the new
government. In 1994, South Africa’s vast
black majority emerged from almost a cen-
tury of racial oppression, segregation, and
engineered poverty, codified for four decades
as the system of apartheid. The long national
political struggle for democracy, coupled
with a period of exposure to democratic in-
stitutions both outside South Africa and
inside the country through trade unions and
civic associations, infused the new South
African leadership (primarily in the African
National Congress Alliance) and many of
their constituencies with a broad democratic
agenda—from “one-person one-vote” to
control of local development projects by
elected community-based organizations. A
focus on democracy, participation, and citi-
zen empowerment infuses the African Na-
tional Congress’s (ANC)—and soon after
the first government’s—Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP):
[T]his programme must become a
people-driven process. Our people,
with their aspirations and collective
determination, are our most important
resource. The RDP is focused on peo-
ple’s immediate needs and it relies, in
turn, on their energies. Irrespective of
race or sex, or whether they are rural or
urban, rich or poor, the people of South
Africa must shape their own future.
Development is not about the delivery
of goods to a passive citizenry. It is
about active involvement and growing
empowerment (RDP 1994, 5).
Sectoral social movements and commu-
nity-based organizations, formed in opposi-
tion to apartheid, had a considerable history
of participatory democracy in their decision-
making structures. These were seen in the
RDPas an important asset. The government
pledged that
[S]tructured consultation processes at
all levels of government will be intro-
duced to ensure participation in policy-
making and planning, as well as project
implementation. The empowerment of
institutions of civil society is a funda-
mental aim of the Government’s ap-
proach to building national consensus
. . . To facilitate effective involvement,
the Government will introduce pro-
grammes that will enhance the capacity
of community organisations (RDP
1994, 41).
RDPforums, to be broadly representative,
were to be formed in each community
to contribute to developing planning and
implementation.
At the same time, South Africa’s his-
tory of political conflict, including extreme
racial and class polarization, violent politi-
cal strife, and brutality characterizing the
state and spilling over into the citizenry,
meant that any attempts at creating demo-
cratic institutions working toward a national
consensus and common good, were impor-
tant but elusive goals—not to be achieved
easily or wholly. A national public works
program distributing resources to reduce
poverty while building capacity and promot-
ing participation by local institutions would
be no exception. These programs would in-
volve the same range of political and eco-
nomic actors (government, private sector
companies, poor communities, trade unions,
and others) who had struggled with each
other under the old apartheid system and
had just recently emerged from that system.
The National Public Works Programme
(NPWP) was also conceived and operation-
alized in an institutional context defined by
South Africa’s unique political-economic
history. A strong trade union movement
(born largely in the 1970s and progressively
gaining economic and later political power)
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tor in 1992 formed a negotiating forum to
jointly formulate strategies for economic
development. In 1993, a task team within
the National Economic Forum (NEF) was
formed to develop a proposal for a National
Public Works Programme (NPWP).
The focus on public works can be under-
stood within the context of the high poverty
and unemployment rates inherited by the
new government. Using October Household
Survey (OHS) 1995 data and the broad def-
inition of unemployment (the number of
people aged 16–64 who are not working but
would like to work and are either actively
seeking work or are too discouraged to con-
tinue looking), the Poverty and Inequality
Report (PIR) (May et al. 1998) generates
an estimate of 30.3 percent for all adults.
Klasen (1997) also uses this broad defini-
tion of unemployment for his analysis using
the SALDRU 1993 data (PSLSD 1994). He
estimated unemployment at 29.9 percent for
the entire country.
Disaggregated by race, unemployment
under the broad definition was estimated
for “African” at 38.3 percent and for
“Coloured” (the main racial group in the
Western Cape province where our study took
place) at 20 percent. Poverty and unemploy-
ment went hand in hand as they normally
do, but in South Africa it is exacerbated by
race:
apartheid has left the majority of the
population in poverty, with little access
to employment, education, health or
other basic services. It enforced a spa-
tially unsustainable residential pattern,
leaving a majority of the poor in eco-
nomically marginal areas of the coun-
try, dependent on transfers and what-
ever incomes they could eke out of the
available resource base (Klasen 1997).
Klasen (1997) estimated a poverty rate of
between 23.7 and 56.7 percent, depending
on the poverty line used. May et al. (1998)
used 1995 National Income and Expendi-
ture Survey data to derive a poverty rate of
49.9 percent, with a rate of 61 percent for
Africans and 38.2 percent for the “Col-
oured” population.
Facing high unemployment and poverty
levels and a newly elected democratic gov-
ernment pledged to alleviate these prob-
lems, a wide range of institutions called for
government and the private sector to make
job creation a central priority. Between 1994
and 1998, a number of institutions and pol-
icy documents called for public works pro-
grams as part of a strategy for employment
creation. These included the NEF (NEF
1994a, 1994b), the RDP (RDP 1994), the
Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU), the Urban Foundation (Urban
Foundation 1994), the government’s Growth,
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)
macroeconomic policy (Ministry of Finance
1996), the Presidential Commission on the
Labour Market (Department of Labour
1996); the Poverty and Inequality Report
(May et al. 1998); and the Department of
Labour’s Employment Strategy Framework
(Department of Labour 1998).
The NEF team tasked with developing
the NPWP had the mandate to develop a
national program that would not be just
temporary “make work” programs but, as
part of the Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP), they were to be partici-
patory and result in sustainable poverty all-
evation. The NPWP took its cues from the
participatory development focus of the RDP,
of which it was a part. One of the NPWP’s
four objectives is to “build the capacity of
communities to manage their own affairs”
(NEF 1994a). A flagship program of the
NPWP was the Community-Based Public
Works Programme (CBPWP):
The CBPWP (Community-Based Pub-
lic Works Programme) believes that
projects should have strong community
participation. The community should
control all processes leading to the ulti-
mate establishment of the asset. This
means that even before the process of
6 CHAPTER 2institution building occurs, the total
community should have adequately and
actively participated in all the aspects
of the second phase i.e., project con-
ception and prioritization. Further, this
means that the community through its
representative community structure,
should make the decisions about what
should be constructed, how it should be
designed and constructed, who should
work on the project, as well as the rates
and system of employment (DPW
1996, 38).
Along the project cycle, community par-
ticipation can take place at different stages.
This cycle includes selecting project type;
many aspects of project design, from choos-
ing labor versus capital intensity to func-
tionality for whom; project implementation,
including hiring contractors; selecting, hir-
ing, and supervising workers; supervision of
construction; and maintenance and man-
agement of assets. Bringing community
members into these roles would necessarily
require skills training and capacity develop-
ment. Each stage also involves the activa-
tion of a range of different material and
political interests.
There are also different types of partici-
pation that can be employed at each of these
stages. Paul (1987) distinguishes four types
of participation: (1) information sharing;
(2)  consultation; (3) decisionmaking; and
(4) initiating action. Moving from (1) to (4),
communities tend to gain and exercise
more power and control. The intention of
the NPWPwas that participation would ide-
ally involve up to and including the fourth
type but definitely the third. In practice,
the type of participation varied greatly in
the 101 projects in the Western Cape and
among the projects in the case studies, with
most involving (1) and (2), and some in-
volving (3) or (4).
Nelson and Wright (1995) make another
important distinction, between participation
as a means and participation as an end. The
first uses participation to accomplish the
aims of a project more efficiently or effec-
tively; the second involves a community or
group setting up a process to control its own
development: “Both types imply very dif-
ferent power relationships between members
of a community as well as between them and
the state and agency institutions. Simply put,
the extent of empowerment and involve-
ment of the local population is more limited
in the first approach than in the second.”
In South African public works programs,
the focus was strongly on participation as
an end, as community capacity building was
one of the main objectives. Participation was
supposed to be maximized, and communities
empowered, without a great deal of consid-
eration given to the efficiency implications
of this choice. However, as this report will
show, participation can also be a means to
an efficient outcome, and ultimately this has
to be considered in the South African con-
text, because good quality infrastructure at a
reasonable cost is also a political and eco-
nomic requisite. Although the two can be
complementary in practice, our research re-
vealed a potential tension. The challenge is to
find practices that enable the maximization
of both types of goals, but where there are
trade-offs, policymakers and citizens should
make these explicit within policy debates.
The Socioeconomic and
Political Context in 
Western Cape Province
Although community-driven development
was an ANC priority at the national level,
implementation had to be carried out at the
provincial and local levels. It is thus equally
essential to understand the economic and
political context in the Western Cape prov-
ince. Labor-intensive public works programs
in the Western Cape are inserted into a set of
government and civil society institutions at
the provincial, regional, and local levels. In
the period following the transition to democ-
racy, these institutions were in a process of
change, yet built upon inherited structures
and racially defined relationships.
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economic and political conditions, as well
as a politicized racial profile, that stands
out from the rest of South Africa. In the
late 1990s the province contained approx-
imately 9.7 percent of the total South
African population and was highly urban-
ized at 89 percent. The province is domi-
nated by the Cape Metropolitan Region
which contained nearly 70 percent of the
population of whom 98 percent were classi-
fied as urban. The legacy of apartheid with
the application of stringent influx control,
coupled to the implementation of the col-
ored labor preference policy, constrained the
distribution of the African populace of whom
the vast majority (over 76 percent) are con-
tained within the metropolitan area. Western
Cape is predominantly colored and white,
with a substantial African minority, largely
urban, with better than national average
levels of per capita incomes and other indi-
cators of well-being (with the notable ex-
ception of self-reported illnesses, which tend
to be positively correlated with income and
education levels) including access to health
care and other infrastructure. On the aver-
age, Western Cape is among the most well-
off of all the nine provinces in South Africa.
Nevertheless, there is a substantial poverty
problem as indicated by the relatively high
levels of child stunting, the prevalence of
tuberculosis where the rate of 703 per
100,000 is three times higher than the na-
tional rate, and an above the national aver-
age percent of housing from shacks. Some
of the 42 districts in the province have ex-
tremely high levels of poverty (Adato et al.
1999).
The 1996 census reported 299,114 as
unemployed in the province which gives a
broad rate of 17.9 percent (the lowest in any
of the nine provinces, but still high enough
to generate concern and a call for a share of
a national public works program). This esti-
mate is very similar to those estimates gen-
erated by the October Household Survey
series from 1994–1997 as well as with the
1993 PSLSD data and a number generated
for the RDP in 1994 (Horner 1994).
Historically, social segregation in the
province was not as intensely enforced in
the Western Cape as it was elsewhere, and
in the first part of the century, people of
color had some limited rights. The National
Party took power in 1948 in all districts out-
side the metropole, removing electoral rights
of colored people, Africans, and Indians
(Hellmann 1949; Horrell 1971). Various
forms of limited representation for colored
people throughout the sixties and seventies
eventually meant some improvements in
their material conditions, with the African
population left behind. However, services for
colored people remained particularly bad in
the rural areas, where poverty was highest.
In 1980 the Nationalist Party Govern-
ment devised its system of tricameral gov-
ernment which downgraded the second tier
of government, provincial councils, to man-
agerial rather than elected governmental or-
gans, consolidating power at the center with
an elaborate system of local authorities based
on racially defined criteria (SAIRR 1985).
It neglected, however, to provide many of
these organs at the third tier of government
with the necessary financial support to
function efficiently and effectively. In 1986
the Provincial Government Act abolished the
(white, elected) provincial councils, em-
powering the state president to appoint pro-
vincial administrators and executive com-
mittees. In the Cape, the state president
confirmed the re-appointment of the previ-
ous (nationalist) administrator and included
colored people in the five-man executive
committee (SAIRR 1987).
Opposition to apartheid also swelled in
the 1980s. In 1983 the newly formed United
Democratic Front (UDF) drew strong sup-
port in those areas that were later demar-
cated as constituting the Province of the
Western Cape. This broadly based move-
ment was to play an influential part in the
political life of the province in the 1980s until
it was disbanded in August 1991 (SAIRR
8 CHAPTER 21992). In 1994, as the ANC won 62.6 percent
of votes nationally to the National Party’s
20.4 percent and the Democratic Party’s 1.7
percent, the newly demarcated Western Cape
province remained the one province with
National Party control (SAIRR 1995). In
the election for the provincial legislature the
NP won 55 percent of the 42 seats (23), the
ANC 33 percent (14), and the Democratic
Party (DP) three seats, with one seat each
to smaller parties. The NP took seven of the
seats on the provincial executive council
including the premiership, with the ANC
being allocated the other four seats, includ-
ing the portfolios of health; economic affairs;
environment and tourism; and road trans-
port and public works (SAIRR 1995). This
assignment of the public works portfolio to
an ANC ministry was one important factor
playing into political tensions that emerged
in the operationalization of public works
programs at the provincial and local levels.
In 1997 the ANC lost control of this min-
istry when the party withdrew from the pro-
vincial executive committee.
Local government elections in Western
Cape province scheduled for November
1995 were delayed in certain areas because
of a National Party challenge to demarca-
tion of boundaries in the metropole and rural
areas. In those areas where voting occurred
for 886 seats, the ANC secured 34.54 per-
cent and the NP 32.96 percent while inde-
pendents and ratepayers associations secured
the bulk (27.2 percent) of the rest (SAIRR
1996). Deferred elections in the metropole
and certain other areas were held on May 29,
1996. The final outcome of the election for
the 1,446 local government seats in the prov-
ince was: NP43 percent; ANC 34.2 percent;
independents and ratepayers 18.3 percent;
with the DP securing 22 seats, the African
Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), 5; the
PAC, 4; and the Freedom Front (FF), 3
(SAIRR 1997).
This picture of the Western Cape’s polit-
ical development helps to explain political
tensions that would confound post-apartheid
development efforts, including community-
based public works. Historical tensions
between colored and African communities,
based on greater economic and political ben-
efits awarded the former, remained at the
local level, while also helping to explain
political support for the National Party, par-
ticularly in rural areas. Community-driven
development was ANC national policy, but
had to be implemented by largely NP offi-
cials at the provincial and local levels.
Despite support of an ANC public works
minister for the first three years, the imple-
mentation of these community-driven pro-
grams were largely the responsibility of NP
administrators who did not generally share
the ANC objectives. There was also a racial
as well as political dimension to the rela-
tionships, tensions, biases, and incentives of
these different actors—with most of the
officials at the national level African, most
of the officials at the provincial level white,
and most officials at the local level white
or colored. However, race and politics is
highly correlated, with most African officials
(at national, provincial, and local levels)
members of the ANC, and most white offi-
cials (at provincial and local levels) mem-
bers of the NP, and colored officials at the
local level mainly NP affiliated. The effects
of these relationships will be further ex-
plored in later chapters.
Public Works Programs in
Western Cape Province
Given the enormous need for basic infra-
structure in poor communities and the new
government’s commitment to addressing this
need, many infrastructure programs were
initiated in and around 1994. In choosing
which provincial programs to include in this
research, we were guided by two criteria.
First, we selected programs that had multi-
ple objectives. This excluded programs that
had a unitary or strong primary focus on in-
frastructure creation, with a relatively minor
role given to employment creation and/or
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distinction derived by I. T. Transport Ltd.
(1997) from the international literature,
which distinguishes between “Public Works
Programmes” and “low-cost infrastructure
programmes” that have different objectives.
Low-cost infrastructure programs
seek to reduce the cost of infrastructure
construction by using appropriate tech-
nology which includes a high labour
content on grounds of technical feasi-
bility and economic efficiency, with
employment creation as a by-product.
These programme [sic] are not strictly
PWPs as they start from a totally dif-
ferent basis. A PWP starts with a budget
which may be more or less flexible,
and a brief to create employment or
alleviate poverty. It then looks for suit-
able projects (I. T. Transport Ltd. 1997).
However, the programs included in the
study also constructed infrastructure or im-
proved the environment in ways that were
not simply “make-work” projects, but rather
undertook the construction of assets or ac-
tivities identified as high priority for the com-
munities involved. They also provided job
training, and were concerned with commu-
nity participation, though to differing de-
grees. Seven programs met these criteria
and are described below (some key vari-
ables for each program are found in the next
chapter in Table 3.1).4 As noted in the pre-
vious section, each of the public works pro-
grams conceived at the national level had a
provincial level department and program
responsible for program administration. In-
frastructure development and job creation
programs in Western Cape province were
located primarily within the Department of
Transport and Public Works, the national
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry,
and the Department of Housing.5 The seven





Because it began prior to 1994, The NEF
job creation program was conceived and
implemented by institutions of civil society
with participation of the old government.
However, it was the first of the new genera-
tion of public works programs that began
to take a broad development perspective,
focussing on sustainability and multiple ob-
jectives of job creation, quality assets, skills
training, and institutional capacity building.
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4One of the seven programs we have included, Public Works Programme Transport, could be seen as a low-cost
infrastructure program. We have decided to include it because, managed by the provincial Department of Public
Works and Transport (DTPW), it was considered part of the same group of RDP programs that fell under the new
Public Works Programme Directorate and thus followed parallel principles to the other programs we have included.
These principles included increased labor-intensity, training, promotion of small, micro, and medium enterprises
(SMMEs), and community participation. We also felt it was important to include because it was a program in-
tended to experiment with integrating the PWP (the Western Cape version of the NPWP) principles into normal
(line function) roads projects of DTPW (our primary institutional focus), and thus had far-reaching implications.
Several programs were excluded by our selection criteria because they fit the description of low-cost infra-
structure programs. The Municipal Infrastructure Programme (water, sanitation, roads, refuse, electricity, and
health facilities), the Integrated Service Land Projects (providing similar bulk service, as well as schools, police
stations, and other community facilities); the Clinic Upgrading and Building Programme; and the Culture of
Learning Programme (schools) were considered low-cost infrastructure programs rather than public works pro-
grams. Although job creation was stated as one objective of all these programs, it was not at the top of the list,
formally or in practice, and thus labor-intensity was only encouraged and not required.
5The responsibility for the physical construction of assets for the Departments of Health (clinics and hospitals)
and Education (schools) was also transferred to the Department of Transport and Public Works. Construction per-
formed for these two departments did not meet the criteria used for inclusion in the research.PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNITY-BASED PUBLIC WORKS IN SOUTH AFRICA 11
In August 1993, the NEF launched its
job-creation program and identified the
Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA)
to monitor implementation of the projects.
A number of regional economic forums
had been established by local stakeholders
(SAIRR 1994, 440–441), which in the
Western Cape became the Western Cape
Economic Development Forum (WCEDF),
composed of representatives from the trade
unions, civic organizations, and private sec-
tor. These regional forums were involved in
appraising and approving applications for
NEF funding for public works projects in
their areas. Approved applications were
submitted by the regions for final evaluation
by the Accreditation Board for Labour-
intensive Construction (ABLIC) appointed
by the National Co-ordinating Committee





Part of the national government’s NPWP,
the Community-Based Public Works Pro-
gramme (CBPWP) aims at poverty allevia-
tion through job creation, skills training,
delivery of needed assets, and capacity
building. It was seen as a critical safety net
program for vulnerable groups during the
transition period. The main target groups
were the rural poor, youth, and disabled peo-
ple. It also aimed at building the capacity of
civil society to engage with development
issues, giving opportunities for community-
based organizations to manage development
projects, and NGOs to manage delivery
and provide training (DPW 1997, 8). The
Community Employment Programme (CEP)
is part of the CBPWP, administered by a
large national NGO (the Independent De-
velopment Trust [IDT]).
The Clean and Green
Programme (CAG)
This program was funded by the national
government as a “Presidential Lead Project”
and administered by the Provincial Depart-
ment of Transport and Public Works. It
was conceived to clean up the environment,
improve the quality of life and tourism po-
tential, and alleviate poverty through job
creation, human resource development, and
income generation strategies. The program
had a provision for local authority matching
to ensure compliance with the requirements
of the RDP fund. For the sustainability of
the project, institutions (particularly local
authorities) were to make provisions for the
recurrent cost associated with the provision
of a sustainable service. The projects were
also to include a concerted educational cam-
paign to enhance a people-driven and sus-
tainable process.
Pilot Project Programme
Also part of the CBPWP, this program was
initiated by the National Department of Pub-
licWorks in conjunction with provincial de-
partments of public works, and consisted of
12 projects spread across the nine prov-
inces. The purpose of these projects was to
“demonstrate to other government depart-
ments how reorientation of expenditure on
infrastructure projects may be achieved.” In-
formation gained through these pilot projects
was to be (1) disseminated to government de-
partments at national, provincial, and local
levels to further the re-orientation process;
and (2) used to develop guidelines and pro-
vide technical information (CSIR 1997). Key
features of the projects are labor-intensive
designs, tender documentation, skills train-
ing, community participation and liaison,
labor management systems, and task-based
payment.
Public Works Programme Transport
This was part of a fund allocated from the
RDP fund to the National Department of
Transport in July 1995 (DTPW 1996). This
was divided up among the provinces, and
administered by the provincial departments
(in the Western Cape, the DTPW). These
were managed by consultants, with partici-
pation of community committees.12 CHAPTER 2
The Working for Water Programme
The Working for Water Programme (WWP)
is a job creation and environmental program
of the national Department of Water Affairs
and Forestry (DWAF 1996, 3). Ahigh profile
program of the national government and per-
ceived to be particularly successful, it has
received very high levels of funding and ex-
panded rapidly. DWAF calculated in 1998
that it had grown to 240 projects with over
42,000 workers nationally (DWAF 1998, 6).
The program involves cutting down “in-
vading alien plants,” that is, nonindigenous
species such as wattle, pine, and others that
consume large quantities of water. The pro-
gram thus has two main benefits: job cre-
ation, and increasing water availability for
domestic and commercial use, significant
to this water-poor country. Like the NPWP
programs, the WWP includes skills training
and education, support for SMMEs, and
local institutional capacity building as part
of its mandate. It also encourages secondary
industries, and targets women, youth, and
the disabled as beneficiaries. In the Western
Cape, the program was called the Fynbos
Water Conservation Programme and later




The differences between these programs—
and the government departments responsible
for conceiving and implementing them at
the national and provincial levels—would
be expected to account for some of the dif-
ferences in community participation found
across the project dataset and case studies.
The WCEDF would be expected to be
highly participatory because it was under-
taken prior to the establishment of legiti-
mate government structures and was largely
governed by civil society institutions. Com-
munity participation was an important cri-
teria for project funding. In practice, how-
ever, as the first program of its kind trying
to realize multiple objectives, it had many
preoccupations and the operationalization
of participation was less explicitly thought
through and emphasized than in the
CBPWP initiatives. The three programs
falling under the CBPWP (CBPWP, CEP,
and Pilot) would be expected to have the
highest level of participation, particularly
the CEP where the IDT required sole com-
munity control and did not involve local
government. The Transport projects were
not part of the NPWPand could be expected
to be less participatory, as the national De-
partment of Transport was less preoccupied
by participation than the national DPW, and
the provincial DTPW had more independ-
ent authority to implement these than they
did the CBPWP. Finally, the FWWP had so
many objectives that participation had
greater competition than in the NPWP/
CBPWP projects. This program variable is
explored further in our analysis as we look
at project-level outcomes.CHAPTER 3
Research Methods
P
ublic works programs contain public works projects. As explained in Chapter 2, we se-
lected seven programs for inclusion in the study. We then took a census of all projects
within the programs. Table 3.1 presents each of the seven programs, the institution
responsible for project administration, the number of Western Cape projects under each pro-
gram, the number of these categorized as “rural,” and the types of infrastructure or environ-
mental project activity included within each program.
Methods of Data Collection
A number of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods were used in this study.6
Table 3.2 describes each of these methods, the level at which data were collected (project, dis-
trict, local, provincial, and national), and the informants included in the research, from project
workers to national policymakers.
Database of 101 Public Works Projects in Seven Programs
Using project documents and mail-in questionnaires with follow-up telephone calls and visits,
quantitative and qualitative data were collected on approximately 45 variables for each proj-
ect, within the categories as outlined in Table 3.3.
The data were collected in the following manner. Initially, all program level documents
were identified for each of the seven programs (for example, monthly reports, final project
close-out reports, project review summaries). However, these were new programs that had
focused more on getting off the ground than monitoring. It was soon determined that many of
these documents either: (1) contained data taken from project applications and did not reflect
actual data collected during project implementation; (2) were incomplete, existing for some
projects and not others, and/or containing certain pieces of data for some projects and not
others; or (3) contained data that were of questionable origin or contradictory. Thus, in order
to get accurate data, a project-level questionnaire was designed and administered to imple-
menting agents for each project. Project records were mainly used to fill out the question-
naire wherever they existed, though some qualitative information categories (for example,
identification of different agents) had to come directly through interviews with implement-
ing agents, which we triangulated with other information wherever possible. In many
cases, the implementing agent did not have records and visits had to be made to various
6An earlier IFPRI research report by Kerr (2002) also combined quantitative and qualitative methods to look at
effects of participatory development projects and different institutional arrangements.
13program and project administrators or
managers, consultants, contractors, and ac-
countants who helped us to track down data
through internal project paperwork. In the
case of the Independent Development Trust
projects, however, the program managers
would not allow the research team access to
project facilitators, and so certain categories
of information are missing for a number of
these projects.7
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7The IDT was a large NGO with a large public sector funding base. Because it was not a public sector program
we did not have direct access through our contacts in government, who became committed to the process and rec-
ognized the benefits of the research. The IDT in contrast appeared to take a defensive posture toward being the
subject of research, and despite directives from their funders in the government to cooperate with the research,
management decided midway through the research to refuse.
Table 3.1 Public works programs in Western Cape province included in the study
Number outside Cape
Administering Number of Metro/Winelands
Program institution projects (rural)a Types of infrastructure
Clean and Green (CAG) Provincial Department of  10 1 Cleaning (2), greening, alien 
Transport and Public  vegetation clearing (7), 
Works (DTPW) parking area
Community Based Public  DTPW 18 10 Community center, roads, 
Works (CBPWP) stormwater drainage, sanitation,
water supply
Community Employment  Independent  22 21 Community center, roads, 
Programme (CBPWP/CEP) Development Trust stormwater drainage, sanitation, 
(IDT) school, creche, clinic, greening,
roads and stormwater
Fynbos Water Conservation  Department of Water  14 11 Alien vegetation clearing
Project (FWCP) also known  Affairs and Forestry 
as the Fynbos Working for  (DWAF)/Cape 
Water Project (FWWP) Nature Conservation
Pilot Projects (Pilot) Department of Public  2 0 Roads and stormwater
Works/DTPW
Transport Projects (Trans) DTPW 6 4 Roads, roads and stormwater
National Economic Forum/ WCEDF/DBSA 29 19 Community center, roads, 
Western Cape Economic  stormwater drainage, sanitation, 
Development Forum  water supply, cleanup, recreation
(WCEDF/NEF) grounds, roads and stormwater,
multiple services, bridge
aIn South Africa, there is no easy distinction between rural and urban, because so many localities have characteristics often associated with
both. Previous government definitions of urban based on the existence of a local authority is not useful given the restructuring of local gov-
ernment in urban and rural areas. We thus instead use an (imperfect but useful) distinction between locations in or on the outskirts of Cape
Town, Paarl and Stellenbosch (the Cape Metro/Winelands regions), and those elsewhere in the province.Project Case Studies
Eight8 in-depth case studies were conducted
in the second phase of the research. The proj-
ects were selected purposively so as to gener-
ate variation in type of institutional arrange-
ment, rural/urban location, and infrastructure
type. We selected a subset of candidate proj-
ects in numbers roughly proportional to the
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8We actually captured events at a total of nine projects because the Kahayelitsha project comprised two separate
construction projects. We describe it as one project because the governing structure, processes, community, and
Table 3.2 Description of data collection methods
Source of information
Focus Household
Project Semi- groups/ surveys from
Information records and Project Worker structured PRA secondary




Project Various documents Mail-in with 
from 101 projects telephone and
visit follow-ups
Local government 12 individual 
officials and two group
interviews
Community-based 13 individual




(CBO) or other 
community-based 
key instruments
Consultants, Eight  individual 
contractors, and  and one group 
emerging interviews
contractors
Other project staff, 
supervisors, trailers
Former project  193 questionnaires Eight 
workers in seven projects workshops




and policy advisorsfrequency of the values of the stratifying
variables. From the subset of candidate
projects we made a final project selection
based on criteria such as geographical
spread; formal roles of local government,
CBOs, NGOs, and consultants;9 existence
of second-round effects;10 existence of sub-
contractors; types of payment systems; and
interest generated among policymakers.
Table 3.4 presents a profile of each of the
case studies selected, including their pro-
gram, magisterial district, and type of asset
or activity. It also includes some basic indi-
cators for these projects, including employ-
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infrastructure were the same, though the timing and workers were different (the projects started on the same date,
but one ran much longer in part due to a conflict-related delay).
9This was intended to capture different levels and types of participation. Although we selected on de jure rather
than de facto participation, we ended up with de facto participation at the following levels: one case study each
in the categories highest, very high, high, and no participation; two projects with medium participation (count-
ing Khayletisha as two), and two medium-low participation. Table 5.1 indicates which projects fall into these
categories.
10Second-round effects are indirect effects or “spin-offs” from the project, beyond their immediate transfer of in-
come for workers. Examples include development of skills that could help workers secure future employment, a
community hall that is used as a skills training workshop, or an enhanced ability of community members to man-
age development activities.
Table 3.3 Data collected at the project-level, 101 Western Cape public works projects
Category of information Type of data collected
Project location Town, residence of workers, magisterial district, development region; rural/urban
Durations Actual and projected; dates
Institutional arrangements Administering institutions; applicants; implementing agents; community-based
organization (CBO) roles; identity of consultants and contractors
Assets and activities Primary activities and project components
Costs Projected and actual; sources of funding (tiers of government and private)
Employment generated Projected and actual work days, for men and women
Wages Wage rates, initial and final, skilled and unskilled; comparative rural sector wage
rates
Payment systems Daily wage or task-based
Labor disputes Existence or absence
Training Costs; number of days; content; training institution
Small/medium enterprises Existence or absence
Second-round effects Existence or absence; types
Maintenance arrangements Responsible institution
Comments Any other points of interestment generated; employment for women;
whether they paid daily wages or gave
task-based payments; labor stoppages; and
whether there were second-round effects.
Figure 3.1 shows a corresponding map of
the magisterial districts where the case-
study projects are located.
For seven11 of the eight project case
studies, a survey was conducted among for-
mer workers to determine their employment
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11In the project at Kylemore, a post-project survey could not be conducted because most of the original project
workers were still working on the project. The FWWP projects were different from the other programs in that
they were ongoing, so workers at this newer project were still on their contract.
Table 3.4 Summary profile of the eight in-depth case studies selected from the 101 projects
Second-
Worker Percent of Method round
Asset days workdays of Labor effect
Project Program Districta generated generated to women payment stoppage reportedd
Langa CAG Goodwood Clean-up and
greening 11,600 60 Wage No Yes
Khayelitshab Pilot Mitchells Plain Roads and 12,289 18 Task Yes Yes
4C stormwater
drainage
Khayelitshab Pilot Mitchells Plain Roads and 29,462 5 Task Yes Yes
3A stormwater
drainage
Lutzville CBPWP Vredendal Community 2,490 12 Wage No Yes
center
Thembaletu Trans George Stormwater 16,500 40 Wage Yes Yes
and roads
Clanwilliam CBPWP Clanwilliam Stormwater 2,981 10 Wage Yes Yes
drainage
Murraysburg CBPWP Murraysburg Water 4,364 0 Wage Yes Yes
reticulation
Kylemorec FWWP Stellenbosch Removal of  Wage/task Yes No
alien vegetation
Stellenbosch FWWP Stellenbosch Removal of  47,285 44 Wage/task Yes Yes
alien vegetation
aSee Figure 3.1.
bThe Khayelitsha Pilot projects were two separate contracts in two areas, with data kept separately, so for the purposes of our database they are
treated separately. However, because they had the same consultants, contractors, and community steering committees, for the purposes of our
case study they are treated as one.
cWorker day figures are not available for Kylemore because at the time the database was constructed, the Stellenbosch project included Kyle-
more (prior to our case studies it was split into a separate project with separate managers and committees).
cNote that the Fynbos Working for Water projects are ongoing, and thus do not have end dates. For data collection on these projects, we chose a
15-month period from initial start-up until the end of January 1997, when most of the other public works projects were complete.
dSecond-round effects are indirect economic or social impacts of a project; for example, the building of a community center that is later used
as a skills-training facility.histories pre and post public works projects
to determine if participation in the projects
assisted them in improving their access to
employment following the project. Asurvey
of the impact of the projects on the poverty
status of former workers was not under-
taken due to resource constraints, though
the nonexistence of baseline data would
have limited the value of this exercise had it
been undertaken. Given this stage in the
development of public works programs in
South Africa—the completion of a first
round of programs and the start of planning
expanded programs building on lessons from
the first round—we believed it most pro-
ductive to focus on program and project-
level variables and issues to be resolved.
In designing and selecting the partici-
pants for the case studies and institutional
study, a “stakeholder” approach was used.
“Stakeholder” analysis is defined in several
ways, all of which we considered in our iden-
tification and selection of interviewees and
focus group participants. In program evalu-
ation, stakeholders are defined as “people
whose lives are affected by the programme
and people whose decisions can affect the
future of the programme” (Greene 1988).
Selection should be informed by diversity
and representativeness (Guba and Lincoln
1981), and in a utilization-focused approach,
“stakeholders are people who have a stake
—a vested interest—in evaluation findings
. . . decision-makers and information users
who have questions about a programme”
(Patton 1986).
Using the conceptual framework we de-
velop in more detail in the next chapter, we
can identify the stakeholders as financiers,
providers, and beneficiaries. Financiers were
the national government officials, including
policymakers and program managers, and
to a lesser extent provincial government
officials (in a dual role, mainly serving as a
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19provider). Providers compose the largest
group of stakeholders. These included:
community-based project steering commit-
tee (PSC) representatives; community-based
organization representatives; local govern-
ment councilors, municipality officials, and
staff. There were also agents of providers:
including consulting engineers and archi-
tects (sometimes crossing the line into be-
ing providers themselves), contractors, the
community liaison officer (CLO, in a dual
role—also serving as agent of beneficiaries),
and supervisors. Beneficiaries included proj-
ect workers, other community members, and
subcontractors. Agents of beneficiaries in-
cluded worker committees (sometimes in a
dual role as providers, with their role limited
to decisionmaking on labor issues), trade
union representatives, and the CLO. Not all
projects had the exact same role-players but
all had variations of the above categories.
For each case study, these individuals
were identified and in-depth, semi-structured
interviews were conducted based on a struc-
tured interview guide. Interviews were con-
ducted with either all of the members of a
particular group (if there were between one
to five people involved, such as the consult-
ants or contractors), or where a particular
role-player involved multiple people (for
example, the PSC, local government), a se-
lection of representatives were interviewed,
based on several factors. For example, only
local government officials identified as
having been involved in the project in
some capacity, directly or as an interested
observer, were interviewed. In the case of
PSCs, approximately 60–90 percent of the
members were interviewed, depending on
their availability.
Research workshops were held with for-
mer project workers, using a combination
of focus groups and participatory appraisal
(PRA) methods that use visual exercises
to engage participants and stimulate their
thinking. In selecting the former project
workers to participate in the workshops, we
invited all workers in the three projects that
had under 30 workers in total. In the five
projects with over 100 workers, we used a
stratified random sample from a list of all
project workers, proportional to the number
of men and women workers. Approximately
70 workers were selected per project to en-
sure that at least 30 showed up to the work-
shop (between 30 and 50 showed up). Al-
though we held workshops on the weekend
to minimize a bias toward those who were
unemployed (that is, less successful in find-
ing a job after the project), we are aware that
in the three large urban projects it may have
been disproportionately unemployed people
who came to the workshops. This was be-
cause of the incentive of a small “trans-
portation” fee and meal offered (in these
urban areas many people would be unlikely
to show up on a weekend without this in-
centive), and the fact that when people hear
about a workshop related to the public works
project, many come in the hope that it may
lead to a job (regardless of the fact that the
purpose of the workshop is explained in
the invitation).
In selecting former project workers for
the survey, we also used a random sample
proportional to the number of men and
women on the projects, but a different sam-
ple from that used for workshop invitations.
For the projects with under 30 people, all
workers were surveyed. For the projects
with over 100, a sample of 30 percent was
used. In addition, at the two projects using
subcontractors, five subcontractors per proj-
ect were also surveyed.
Finally, the study also included an analy-
sis of the policy process surrounding these
public works programs at the national and
provincial levels, as well as political econ-
omy issues. This required key informant
interviews with a wide range of national
and provincial policymakers, program man-
agers, policy advisors, and trade unions and
NGO representatives. Altogether over 80 key
informant interviews were carried out for
the study (see Adato et al. 1999 for a full de-
scription of study methods and findings).
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The Impact of Participation on Project
Outcomes: Evidence from the Full Sample
O
ur research is concerned with participation as both an end and a means, and we em-
ploy a particular analytical approach to studying the latter. Having set out the back-
ground for this study as well as the methods used to collect our data, we now turn to
one of the core objectives of our work: to assess whether community participation affects
project performance. To do so we first set out a conceptual model to capture some of the an-
alytics of participation. We then use this model to help frame an econometric analysis of project
outcomes.
We begin by identifying the actors, making links between community participation, social
capital, and trust as well as noting the importance of defining precisely what is meant by
community participation. We then set out a simple model that identifies the main trade-
offs involved in how different modes of delivery vary in the costs of intervening and the design
of objectives.
Some Analytics of Participation:
Financiers, Providers, and Beneficiaries
Consider a world comprised of three groups: financiers, providers, and beneficiaries.12 The
primary role of the financier is to provide funds. Multilateral and bilateral donors, ministries
of finance, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are all examples of financiers. As
noted in Chapter 2, in the case of the Western Cape, the financiers for these public works pro-
grams were largely from national government. Given the discussion in Chapter 2, it is reason-
able to assume that the financier is interested in reducing poverty but has only a limited budget
to do so. The main role of providers is to implement interventions. Providers may be line min-
istries, autonomous government agencies, private firms, NGOs, or community-based organi-
zations (CBO). Here, we are thinking of “communities” as being a group of individuals within
a geographically defined area who collectively implement an intervention with financial back-
ing from the financier. (The following chapters provide specific examples of these.) Benefi-
ciaries comprise the communities, households, and individuals who are the intended recipients
of program benefits, the poor. Note that the roles of these three groups are not always strictly
delineated. Depending on context, financiers, providers, or beneficiaries may initiate, design,
12A similar version of this model with a longer literature review appeared in earlier drafts of this report and in
Hoddinott (2002).
20and/or implement the intervention. Commu-
nities and beneficiaries can be co-financiers
as well as beneficiaries of interventions.
Poverty alleviation projects typically
have multiple objectives or outcomes valued
by the actors involved in the intervention.
In the Western Cape, objectives included job
creation; the building and rehabilitation of
infrastructure, or improvements to the natu-
ral environment; the provision of job train-
ing that would enable workers to find post-
project employment; and capacity building
of communities. Without loss of generality,
we will develop our model on the basis of a
project that is characterized by a pair of ob-
jectives (z1, z2). For example, suppose that
the anti-poverty intervention aims to reduce
poverty in both the short and long term. In
this context, z1 would be the level of cur-
rent consumption of intended beneficiaries
while z2 is the extent to which the program
tries to create human capital and eliminate
long-term poverty.
There is no reason to expect that all ac-
tors will have identical preferences over
program objectives. In the case of public
works, for example, actors may differ in the
weights given to job creation and training.
Given a pair of realized objectives, we de-
note the outcome that accrues to the poor
as B(z1, z2). We assume that B(., .) is in-
creasing in both arguments and that bene-
ficiaries do not pay any of the costs of
poverty reduction; z1 and z2 are measured
so that more of both of them is considered
to be a good thing.
Providers—in the case we will consider
here, community-based organizations—and
financiers—here government—have their
own objectives in addition to caring about
the poor. For the government this is
G(z1, z2) = 
βg(z1, z) + (1 – β)B(z1, z2)
(1)
where g(⋅, ⋅) represents any “private” bene-
fit that the government receives from hav-
ing the program designed in a particular way.
For example, the government might wish to
deliver benefits to particular ethnic groups.
It could also represent differences in dis-
count rates that imply different weighting
of long- and short-term poverty allevia-
tion benefits. The parameter β denotes the
weight given to the government’s versus the
poor’s payoff; where β = 0, the government
and the poor have identical preferences. The
community’s preferences is denoted by
R(z1, z2) = 
αr(z1, z) + (1 – α)B(z1, z2),
(2)
where r(⋅, ⋅) denotes the “private” payoff of
the community organization and α is the
weight that it attaches to its own preference
relative to that of the poor beneficiaries.
We now consider what would happen if
the government managed the poverty reduc-
tion program, that is it is both financier and
implementer. Any government expenditures
not allocated to the project can be spent on
some other valuable activity whose price is
normalized at one. Thus, the government’s
objective is to choose (z1, z2) to maximize
G(z1, z2) – C(z1, z2). Let the optimal values
of this be, (z1
G, z2
G). Thus, the benefit to the
poor is BG(z1
G, z2




Alternatively, the government could con-
tract provision to the community whose cost
function is denoted by c(z1, z2). We assume
that the community enjoys an absolute ad-
vantage in production of both goals so that
C(z1, z2) > c (z1, z2). We also assume that
∂c(z1, z2) ∂C(z1, z2)
———— < ————–
∂zi ∂zi
for all (z1, z2), i = (1, 2).13 Given this cost
advantage, a Pareto improvement is, in
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13Hoddinott (2002) provides a detailed set of examples showing the different ways in which communities have a
cost advantage.principle, possible from decentralizing the
program to have some kind of community





G). Thus, the government could
pay the community organization a transfer
of t = c (z1
G,z 2
G) to undertake the project on
its behalf, thereby saving money. Note,
however, that solution is not incentive com-
patible unless the government has some
direct way of controlling the community or-
ganization’s inclination to change the pro-
gram’s objectives ex post. This is because
preferences over project objectives may dif-







max {R(z1, z2) : C(z1, z2) = y}
(3)
Thus, if it were given a transfer of c(z1
G,z 2
G)
to undertake the project, the community





G))}. This would be the solution
under community management if it were not
possible for the government to write some
kind of contract that restrained the commu-
nity’s behavior. Thus, we are assuming an
extreme form of contractual incompleteness
in the model, a reasonable assumption when
the precise objectives of poverty alleviation
programs are very hard to describe ex ante.
It is interesting to ask when the gov-
ernment would wish to decentralize man-




C( y)) – y},
(4)
as the optimal poverty alleviation budget
to grant to a community given that the re-
source allocation decision will be made at
the community level. Then the government
will prefer to have a community organization
manage a poverty alleviation project if
G(z1
C(yG), z2






The left-hand side is the payoff of the
government if it gives a budget of yG to
the community and the right-hand side is the
payoff to the government under pure gov-
ernment provision. It is easy to see that
the likelihood of community involvement
is highest where (1) government and com-
munity preferences are more congruent and
(2) the absolute cost advantage of the com-
munity (net of government’s monitoring
costs) is largest.
Such cost advantages could stem from
multiple sources. There may be interventions
where knowledge of local conditions is es-
pecially important and where the cost of the
acquisition of such knowledge by outsiders
is high. Second, community participation
may reduce the likelihood of moral hazard
or adverse selection problems. In the con-
text of public works projects where a daily
wage payment is made, involvement by the
community in the hiring of labor may in-
crease the likelihood that those most in need
of work and/or are more likely to show up
receive employment, and those less in need
and/or with a propensity to shirk, are ex-
cluded. Third, communities may have abili-
ties to lower costs that are not available to
outsiders. For example, communities could
encourage participants to accept lower
wages than those officially sanctioned so as
to generate savings that can be put toward
other objectives such as training. However,
it does not necessarily follow that all costs
are lowered when beneficiaries have in-
creased involvement in the design and im-
plementation of interventions. Abraham and
Platteau (2001, 11) document the impor-
tance placed on ensuring unanimity and
consensus in self-help projects in a Nairobi
slum, resulting in “considerable efforts and
time spent in lengthy discussions at meet-
ings and assemblies as well as in the pro-
tracted mediation procedures to settle inter-
personal conflicts.” Khwaja (2001) finds that
community participation in what is described
as “technical decisions”—such as project
capacity—resulted in projects requiring
22 CHAPTER 4greater maintenance. If all costs are paid
by an external financier and the budget con-
straints are not hard (that is, strict limits on
costs are not imposed), communities may not
have an incentive to control costs where they
can capture additional resources that flow
from the financier. Other providers may
offer cost advantages in other areas. For
example, liaising with a myriad number of
communities will carry higher administra-
tive costs to the financier than contracting
with a single provider. A large NGO or
private firm may be able to benefit from
economies of scale, or superior manage-
ment skills.
The community organization also has to
be willing to undertake management of the
project—it is not reasonable to assume that
projects can be foisted on an unwilling or-






Now consider the well-being of the poor.
Most of the discussion of poverty reduction
tends to assume that the community organi-
zations are more in tune with the prefer-
ences of the beneficiaries. If the community
cares solely about the beneficiaries, then
whenever community management is good
for the poor, it will be chosen by the com-
munity. However, if there is an agency prob-
lem, in the sense that the well-being of the
poor and the community organization are
not fully in tune, there is no guarantee that
this will be the case.
Example: Suppose that the only differ-
ence in preferences is which group to target
resources on. Thus, let b (zi) be utility of
members of group iwhen the aim of the anti-
poverty program is to get them to an income
of zi. We assume that b (zi) = log (zi). There
are two groups and let λ be the share of type
1’s in the population. The overall benefit in-
dicator of the poor is λb(z1) – (1 – λ)log(z2).
The government and the community organi-
zation differ in the weight that they attach to
the well-being of each group. Thus,
G(z1, z2) = β log(z1) + (1 – β)log(z2)
(7)
and
R(z1, z2) = α log(z1) + (1 – α)log(z2)
(8)
where α≥λ>β . This says that the govern-
ment favors group 2 when it designs the
program. We assume that there is a trans-
action cost c i(Ci) for the community organ-
ization (government) to reach group i, and
the initial (pre-transfer) income for group i
is the same and fixed at y. Then the cost of
achieving the objective is
λz1 + (1 – λ)z2 – y + C1λ + C2(1 – λ) 
≡λ 1z1 + (1 – λ)z2 + Γ (9)
if the government manages the project and
λz1 + (1 – λ)z2 – y – c1λ1 + c2(1 – λ) 
≡λ 1z1 + (1 – λ)z2 + γ (10)
if the community organization does. It is now
easy to check that
β (1 – β) (z1
G, z2
G) = {—, ———}.
λ (1 – λ)




α (1 – α) = {— ( y – γ), ——— ( y – γ)} λ (1 – λ)
and that yG = 1 + γ. So in this case, the un-
constrained community optimum and the
constrained optimum yield the same allo-
cation. The community organization spends
more on the group that it favors relatively
to the government. The two conditions for
community participation to be optimal are
α 1 – α βlog(—) + (1 – β)log(———) – 1 – γ
λ (1 – λ)
β 1 – β > βlog(—) +(1 – β)log(———) – 1– Γ
λ (1 – λ)
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α 1 – α αlog(—) + (1 – α)log(———) γ (1 – λ)
β 1 – β >αlog(—) + (1 – α)log(———).
λ (1 – λ)
The latter is clearly satisfied. The former will
be satisfied when Γ is much larger than γ and
α is closer to β. Whether the poor’s benefit
goes up or down depends upon whether
α 1 – α λlog(—) + (1 – λ)log(———) λ (1 – λ)
β 1 – β >λlog(—) + (1 – λ)log(———).
λ (1 – λ)
This will tend to be the case if α is
closer to λ than is β, that is, there is less
of an agency problem with community
organizations.
There are two additional issues that
should be noted. In this three-entity context,
participation in antipoverty interventions is
a process whereby financiers enter into a
contractual arrangement with beneficiaries
who become involved in aspects of provi-
sion, and possibly finance. Afeature that we
will return to at several points is the fact
that, as in all contractual relations, it is im-
possible to set out in advance all possible
contingencies that will arise. In such cir-
cumstances, establishing who has decision-
making power has a direct bearing on what
is meant by community participation. Specif-
ically, one can distinguish between formal
(de jure) and real (de facto) authority. For-
mal authority is the right to decide; real au-
thority is the effective control over decisions
(Aghion and Tirole 1997). The importance
of this distinction lies in the possibility that
in the absence of delegation of de facto
decisionmaking power, potential benefi-
ciaries may be reluctant to act because of
concerns that they will be overruled sub-
sequently. Alternatively, central authorities
may subsequently renege on commitments
and the threat of this generates a hold-up
problem (providers are unwilling to act out
of concern that decisions they make will be
subsequently over-ruled).
A second issue is that this conceptual
framework treats communities as homoge-
neous entities.14 Yet as one of our key in-
formants observed
There’s very few community leaders 
in this country who will really let their
communities work because they are
also engulfed in this great bitterness of
the past and they’re always infighting
about this opinion and that opinion.
And that really tears communities apart
because they never get down to saying
that these are the issues that we need to
work on. Because I mean after all you
cannot work in conflict, you cannot
work in difference of opinions espe-
cially if you take on projects. You have
to work as a team to let that project
work, be it to put a local clinic there 
or be it to build a couple of houses or
water. You will always find the com-
munities who are successful in South
Africa are those communities who
basically stick together as a unit. They
might have their difference of opinion,
but their difference of opinion have not
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14Purely on theoretical grounds, this is dubious given Arrow’s (1951) well-known impossibility theorem. Note
too that financiers and other providers may not be homogeneous either. The donor acting as a financier might en-
compass a project leader who is interested in maximizing prestige; middle managers anxious to protect their
budgets; and lower level functionaries interested in promotion. Further, each actor may be accountable to a num-
ber of constituencies. For example, an engineer within a government public works department who is responsible
for providing drinking water to a locality may be answerable to four different groups. These could include her
superiors within the bureaucracy, a professional organization that accredits and monitors her professional conduct,
local politicians seeking to maximize the benefits flowing to their constituents, and the intended beneficiaries of
the intervention.driven them apart (interview, C. B.,
C.B. Associates).
Community participation requires that
there must exist mechanisms for the discus-
sion of common issues, for the resolution
of differences in opinions, for the allocation
of costs and benefits associated with group
decisions, and for the efficient and effective
monitoring of actions taken by a few on
behalf of the many. In the next chapters,
specific examples are provided of how this
came about in the provision of public works
in the Western Cape. Here we note that the
efficacy of community participation may
be a function of community characteristics
such as the size of the group involved, the
degree of inequality, and the outside options
available to members (see Baland and Plat-
teau (1997) and Dayton-Johnson (2000) for
a discussion). To this can be added the so-
cial capital literature’s emphasis on the
importance of trust across individuals. Trust,
built up by repeated interactions, can help
problems of information asymmetries (dif-
ferences in information held by different
parties) to be solved thereby allowing self-
enforcing agreements to be reached (Knack
and Keefer 1997). Common to both the
literature on collective action and social
capital is the view that polarization inhibits
the construction of relationships of trust.
Easterly and Levine (1997, 1205–06) write,
“polarized communities will be prone to
competitive rent-seeking by the different
groups and have difficulty agreeing on
public goods like infrastructure . . . thereby
impede agreement about the provision of
public goods.”
Concerns regarding the determinants of
effective community action raise two issues,
one practical and the other analytical. The
practical issue is that financiers may be un-
willing, or unable, to assess the ability of
communities to engage in collective action,
nor may they be willing in practice to invest
heavily in the development of such capacity
in the context of a particular development
project.15 Financiers may decide instead that
communities should self-select into partici-
patory projects, perhaps signaling their seri-
ousness by making an up-front contribution
of money or other resources. Indeed, such
actions are often seen as the hallmark of
many successful rural development projects
(Uphoff, Esman, and Krishna 1998). This
may mean that better organized, less frac-
tionalized communities may benefit dis-
proportionately from increased emphasis
on participation. The analytical issue is that
if one accepts the notion that successful
community interventions are those in which
communities self-select into the projects,
this self-selection needs to be taken into ac-
count. It might be the case that localities in
which community participation thrives are
those in which project outcomes are more
likely to be favorable in any case.
To summarize, our conceptual frame-
work identifies three actors: financiers, pro-
viders, and beneficiaries. These multiple
actors may have divergent preferences that
lead them to attach different weights to the
multiple objectives found in most anti-
poverty interventions. One benefit of bene-
ficiary participation lies in the prospect of
reducing the cost of providing antipoverty
interventions. In essence, these are benefits
that are derived from improved implemen-
tation. This is likely to occur where knowl-
edge of local conditions is especially im-
portant, where moral hazard or adverse
selection concerns play a role, where verifi-
cation of actions is needed. Further, com-
munities may have ways of lowering costs
that are not available to outsiders. A further
set of benefits lie in terms of improved de-
sign. Beneficiary participation offers the
potential for the selection of project objec-
tives that more closely reflect the prefer-
ences of the population that they are designed
to serve.
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contingent on two characteristics. The first
is the ability of communities to engage in
collective actions. In fractionalized commu-
nities where trust is weak (perhaps because
of little prior history of collective action or
a history of political conflict such as in the
South African case), there is a risk that
community participation may result in the
capture of benefits by local elites to the detri-
ment of the poor, or that conflict may stall
progress. The second characteristic is the
importance of delegating decisionmaking
authority. Failing to do so—allowing de jure
but not de facto participation—may result in
beneficiaries being reluctant to act because
of concerns that they will be subsequently
overruled.
Data Overview
Table 4.1 provides some descriptive statistics.
Different types of public works activities—
the construction of buildings and roads and
bridges and removing alien vegetation and
garbage—will have differences in require-
ments for materials and for specialist inputs
such as engineering design. Accordingly,
Table 4.1 groups the assets being constructed
as part of these programs into three broad
categories: community buildings such as
centers, schools, and clinics; basic infra-
structure activities such as roads, storm sew-
ers, sanitation sewers, and water reticulation;
and other activities such as the removal of
alien vegetation and general “cleaning and
greening.”
The average project operated for about
nine months, with 20 percent being com-
pleted in less than four months and 33 per-
cent operating for one year or longer. Only
one project operated for more than two
years.16 While projects typically went over-
budget, it was only in the case of the con-
struction of community buildings that
these cost-overruns were significantly high.
Materials-intensive projects such as the
construction of community buildings devote
a lower share of their budgets to labor and
create fewer jobs. Infrastructure develop-
ment and community building projects typ-
ically employed fewer women than other
public works projects.
As noted above, assessing the impact
of community participation and project out-
comes requires a precise definition of what
is meant by these concepts. In particular, it
is important to distinguish between de jure
authority, in the sense of “whose name is on
the contract,” and de facto authority, in the
sense of “who actually is responsible for
planning and implementing the project.”
Our measure of de facto authority is in-
formed by Paul’s (1987) continuum of par-
ticipation from information sharing to con-
sulation to decisionmaking to the initiation
of action as applied to qualitative informa-
tion collected from project managers and
administrators as well as other relevant
parties. Projects were divided into four cat-
egories: (1) the community based organi-
zation (CBO) is solely responsible for all
aspects of the project, including design,
overseeing the contractors, setting wages,
selecting workers, controlling the bank ac-
counts, and so on (32 percent of projects);
(2) the CBO, together with another im-
plementing actor, jointly participates in
decisionmaking over some or all aspects of
the project, including design, overseeing the
contractors, setting wages, selecting workers,
controlling bank accounts, and so on (23
percent of all projects); (3) the CBO assists
in selecting workers, mediates disputes, and
liaises with the community but is not a de-
cision maker; (31 percent of projects); and
(4) cases where the community has little or
no involvement in the project (15 percent of
projects).
Our data are also rich in information on
project outcomes. These can be divided into
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16The exception is the projects in the FWWP, which were continuous. We took a fixed period, from project start
to the end of the period of quantitative research (a 12- to 15-month period) for the purpose of data collection.several categories. First, we would like to
know if community participation enhanced
the attainment of program objectives to cre-
ate employment and training opportunities.
Three outcomes capture this: the share of
the project budget allocated to labor; the
log of the number of days of work created;
and the log of the number of training days
undertaken. Second, we would like to know
who in the community captures these bene-
fits and this is measured in two ways: via
the ratio of the daily project wage to the
local unskilled wage (consistent with the lit-
erature on self-targeting of public works, a
lower ratio is indicative of improved target-
ing toward the poor); and the percentage of
employment that goes to women. Lastly, we
have information on the cost-effectiveness
of community participation. This includes
cost overruns (computed as the ratio of cost
overruns to projected costs as submitted in
the project proposal) relative to projected
costs, the log cost in rands of creating one
day of employment (calculated by dividing
the number of days of employment gener-
ated by the project by its total cost); and the
cost to the government of transferring one
rand to the poor. This variable is the re-
ciprocal of the benefit stream generated by
the project divided by the government ex-
penditure on it. The benefit stream consists
of transfer benefits to workers net of what
they would have earned in the project’s ab-
sence plus non-transfer benefits captured
by the poor.17 A low value indicates that
the project is cost-efficient in delivering re-
sources to the poor.
Table 4.2 provides mean values of these
project outcomes, disaggregated by varying
degrees of community participation.18 The
top panel classifies projects as to whether or
not there is any participation. Community
participation appears to be associated with
an increased share of project budgets being
allocated to labor, and with greater amounts
of job creation and training. However, these
differences are not statistically significant.
Community participation is associated with
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17There are numerous details associated with calculating this figure, including estimating the size of leakages to
the nonpoor, the probability of obtaining work in the absence of the project, worker’s wages on the project,
workers’ wages in the absence of the project, the probability of finding non-project work while working on the
project, and the level of nontransfer benefits. These are documented in Haddad and Adato (2002/03).
18Median values are broadly similar to mean values except for actual costs and number of training days.
Table 4.1 Project characteristics
Constructs Constructs
community basic Other All
Project characteristics buildings infrastructure projects projects
Duration (days) 334 236 329 294
Project cost (’000s rands)a 1,084 1,458 1,322 1,299
Ratio: Cost overruns to planned project costs 30.6 11.3 11.4 18.7
Percent projects over budget 65.6 61.5 66.7 64.3
Project budget share spent on labor 30.7 34.8 70.4 43.3
Ratio: Project wage to local unskilled wage 71.1 81.3 85.0 79.0
Number of person years of work created 33.7 27.1 141.8 60.8
Number of person years of training undertaken 3.8 1.8 5.9 3.6
Percent jobs taken up by women 13.9 20.1 40.2 23.7
Sample size 32 39 27 98
aAlmost all projects (with the exception of four) were completed between early 1995 and the end of 1997. The
exchange rate was R3.5 = $1.00 in January 1995; R4.8 = $1.00 in December 1997.Table 4.2 Mean project performance by degree of community participation
Attaining program objectives Distribution of benefits Cost-effectiveness
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3)
Mean ratio: Mean ratio: Mean
Mean Mean log Project Cost Mean log cost of
project number of Mean log wage to Mean overruns to cost of transferring
budget days of number of the local percentage planned creating one rand
Degree of community share spent work training unskilled employment project one day to a poor
participation on labor created days wages to women costs of work person
No participation 0.37 7.94 5.49 0.85 8.25 13.4 5.12 11.10
Any participation 0.44 8.45 5.94 0.78 25.94 19.2 4.41 7.19
F test on differences in means 0.76 1.25 0.76 0.90 5.80** 0.17 8.75** 3.93**
No participation 0.37 7.94 5.49 0.85 8.25 13.4 5.12 11.10
Community advises but does not decide 0.52 9.61 6.63 0.82 33.84 4.9 4.32 6.47
Community is joint decisionmaker 0.45 7.69 5.09 0.85 21.31 2.1 4.51 8.15
Community is sole decisionmaker 0.35 7.90 5.82 0.70 21.93 41.0 4.40 6.92
F test on differences in means 3.03** 14.25** 5.01** 2.59* 3.78** 4.71** 3.31** 1.70
Note: * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level.improved targeting to the poor, as proxied by
the ratio of project wages to local unskilled
wages as well as a markedly increased share
of employment going to women. While proj-
ects with at least some degree of commu-
nity participation have relatively higher cost
overruns, this difference is not statistically
significant and projects with community
participation appear to have lower costs of
creating work and transferring resources to
the poor.
The bottom panel of Table 4.2 assesses
whether the extent of community participa-
tion affects project performance. While the
F statistic indicates that we can reject the
null that mean outcomes are equal across
differing degrees of participation, the pat-
tern of these differences is not uniform. For
example, job creation and training appear
to be highest in projects where the commu-
nity has an advisory or liaison role but no
decisionmaking authority whereas project
wages are relatively lowest where the com-
munity has sole decisionmaking authority.
Projects with the highest cost overruns,
relative to projected budget are those where
communities have sole decisionmaking
power, next highest where there is no com-
munity participation, and lowest where there
is joint decisionmaking. That all said, there
are a number of reasons why we might not
want to put too much weight on these find-
ings. First, they do not account for other
factors—for example, project characteristics
such as size and type of asset created—that
might also affect these outcomes. Second,
they do not take into account two issues
alluded to in our conceptual framework: the
processes by which projects were situated in
particular localities (also referred to as en-
dogenous program placement [Rosenzweig
and Wolpin 1986 and Pitt, Rosenzweig, and
Gibbons 1993]) and the possible endogene-
ity of community participation.
Project performance may also be affected
by locality characteristics. For example,
labor costs might be higher in areas with
high local wages and low levels of unem-
ployment. To account for this, we will draw
on data that describe the 34 districts in which
the projects are located. These are taken from
the 1995 October Household Survey (OHS),
conducted by the Government of South
Africa’s Central Statistics Service. The
OHS collected detailed household data on
jobs, wages, and employment status; educa-
tion and demographic data; information on
aspects of living standards such as housing
quality and access to infrastructure (water,
electricity, telephones, transport, and health
facilities); and crime and safety. In our
multivariate analysis, these household level
data are aggregated into district means.
Results
Estimation Issues
An estimable model that captures the rela-
tionship between community participation
and project performance can be written as
Iij = β⋅CPij + γ′⋅Pij + η′ ⋅ Li + eij (1)
where: Iij is the performance indicator of
project j located in locality i; CPij captures
the extent of community participation in the
project; Pij is a vector of other project char-
acteristics; Li is a vector of locality charac-
teristics; β, γ and η are parameters to be es-
timated; eij is an error term; and vectors are
written in bold.
As noted above, there are two potential
problems associated with attempting to ob-
tain consistent estimates of β. First, as noted
earlier, governments choose to contract with
community-based organizations and these
organizations choose to accept these con-
tracts. Factors that affect this choice could
also affect project performance. This im-
plies that E(CPij eij) ≠ 0 and therefore that
estimates of β are biased and inconsistent.
Second, government may choose to locate
projects on the basis of locality characteris-
tics, for example citing infrastructure proj-
ects in places with poor infrastructure. This
implies that E(Pij eij) ≠ 0 and that estimates
of both γ and β are biased and inconsistent.
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is to think of participation as an endogenous
“treatment.” That is, we estimate equation (1)
as a treatment effects model using Heck-
man’s (1979) two-step consistent estimator.
This takes the following form:
Iij = β⋅CPij + γ γ′ ′ ⋅ Pij + η η′⋅Li + eij
where CPij, the endogenous dummy vari-
able is assumed to reflect an unobservable
latent variable CPij* which itself is deter-
mined by:
CPij* = τ τ ⋅ wij + νij
where wij are covariates that affect partici-
pation, τ τ are their associated parameters, νij
is a disturbance term and the relationship
between CPij and CPij* is given by:
CPij = 1, if CPij* > 0
= 0, otherwise
and where eij and νij are bivariate normal.
Amongst others, Maddala (1983, 120–22)
shows that consistent estimates of β can be
obtained by first estimating the determinants
of treatment (here, community participation).
From this probit, the hazard (λ) or inverse
Mill’s ratio is calculated and then inserted as
an additional regressor. This gives us:
Iij = β⋅CPij + γ γ′⋅Pij + η η′⋅Li
+ ωλij + eij
(2)
Estimating (2) requires that we identify
covariates (instruments) that plausibly af-
fect participation but do not directly affect
project outcomes. We use two such covari-
ates as instruments for participation.
The first draws on insights found in
Easterly and Levine (1997), Mauro (1995),
and Knack and Keefer (1997). Easterly and
Levine’s note that “an assortment of politi-
cal economy models suggest that polarized
communities will be prone to competitive
rent-seeking by the different groups and have
difficulty agreeing on public goods like infra-
structure . . . ethnic diversity may increase
polarization and thereby impede agreement
about the provision of public goods (East-
erly and Levine 1997, 1205–06). Addition-
ally, where groups have a history of limited
interaction—something certainly true of race
relations in South Africa—one would expect
that levels of trust across groups (which are
built up by repeated interactions) would be
lower. As Knack and Keefer (1997) empha-
size, trust can be thought to help solve prob-
lems of information asymmetries thereby
“allowing self-enforcing agreements to be
reached.”
This suggests that racial fractionaliza-
tion would be a natural determinant of
the likelihood of community participation.
Specifically, we construct an index of ethnic
fractionalization that takes the form: 1 –
ΣI
i=1(ni / N)2 , i = 1, . . . , I; where ni is the
number of people in the ith group, N is
the total population, and I is the number of
groups. By construction, it can range in
value from 0, complete homogeneity—to 1,
complete heterogeneity. We use the OHS
data at the district level on the percentage
of individuals from different racial groups
(White, Colored, African, Asian) to con-
struct the index. These data were collected
prior to the implementation of these pro-
grams so there should not be any reverse
causation from project implementation to
racial fractionalization.
The second covariate follows from the
observation found in the literature on com-
munity-based development that stresses that
past experience with collective action en-
hances the capacity of people to take on new
participatory projects. One covariate that
captures this is the share of the vote that the
African National Congress (ANC, the lead-
ing political party in the struggle for major-
ity rule) received in local elections held in
November 1995 and March 1996—elections
that occurred prior to the implementation of
these projects. The political struggle for
majority rule in South Africa had a strong
“grassroots” community-level participatory
component and communities where this was
30 CHAPTER 4most marked were communities that sup-
ported the ANC. As such, these commu-
nities may be able to engage in a different
form of collective action.19 Further, there
were elections held for approximately 136
local councils; and it appears that for at least
one-third of our sample, our unit of analy-
sis, “the community” maps directly onto a
local election. For the remainder, the “local
council” refers to a geographical entity larger
than “the community” but smaller than a
district.
To see whether these characteristics af-
fect the likelihood of de facto community
participation, we estimated a probit where
the dependent variable equals 1 if there is any
community participation (that is, cases where
the community is the sole decisionmaker,
joint decisionmaker, or plays an advisory
role), zero otherwise. These results are re-
ported in Table 4.3. Racial fractionalization
and ANC voting share in local elections
have a statistically significant effect on the
likelihood of participation at the 1 percent
and 12 percent confidence levels, respec-
tively. Achi squared test does not accept the
null hypothesis that these three correlates of
participation are jointly zero at the 2 percent
confidence level. The sign on racial frac-
tionalization is negative, consistent with the
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received little electoral support in the local elections.
Table 4.3 Probit estimates of the determinants of de facto participation
Dependent variable equals one where
community, de facto, participates
Variable in project decisionmaking 
Log projected duration of project (days) –1.601
(4.63)**
Project constructs community buildings –3.934
(4.17)**
Project constructs basic infrastructure –3.191
(6.04)**
Log average wage in district 6.624
(3.86)**
District unemployment rate 0.386
(3.86)**
District poverty (P0) rate –5.366
(1.92)*
Percentage of households reporting that they feel safe or very safe –0.348
(1.47)
ANC voting share in local council election 4.302
(1.53)
(Significant at the 12% level)




Chi squared on joint significance of instruments 7.61**
(Significant at the 2% level)
Notes: Covariates that serve as instruments for participation are in italics. Absolute values of z statistics are in
parentheses. Standard errors account for clustering at the magisterial district level. * Significant at the
10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level. Magisterial district dummy variables for Metro-
politan Cape Town and Winelands included but not reported. Sample size is 98.hypothesis that increased diversity makes
the provision of public goods more prob-
lematic. The sign on ANC voting share is
positive.
In addition to showing that these co-
variates are correlated with participation, we
also need to demonstrate that they are un-
correlated with project performance. We do
so in two ways.
First, we estimate reduced form deter-
minants of the eight project outcomes we
have been considering. In these regressions,
we exclude community participation, include
the “instruments” racial fractionalization and
ANC vote share, and test to see if these co-
variates are individually and jointly signifi-
cant. These results are reported in Table 4.4.
Neither covariate has a statistically signifi-
cant effect on these project outcomes. Sec-
ond, we construct a “pseudo-Hausman” test.
We estimate a linear probability model with
de facto community participation as the de-
pendent variable and use the same covariates
as in Table 4.4 as regressors. We recover the
residuals and include these in a linear re-
gression where the dependent variables are
the measures of project performance listed
in Table 4.5 and the regressors are (exoge-
nous) de facto community participation as
well as project and locality characteristics.20
In only one case, cost overruns, is an instru-
ment statistically significant at the 15 per-
cent level or better and so we drop this
measure from the remainder of our analysis.
Collectively, we conclude from Tables 4.3,
4.4, and 4.5 that our instruments are corre-
lated with participation but uncorrelated with
the remaining seven performance measures.
In addition to addressing the concern of
endogenous participation above, we noted
that endogenous project placement is also a
potential concern. However, there are sev-
eral reasons why it is unlikely to be prob-
lematic for our work here.
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20We also constructed the over-identification test as set out in Wooldridge (2002, 123) but did not obtain results
any different from those described here.
Table 4.4 Reduced form determinants of project performance
Attaining program objectives Distribution of benefits Cost-effectiveness
Ratio:
Log Project Ratio: Cost Cost of
Project number Log wage to overruns to Log cost transferring
budget of days number of the local Percentage planned of creating one rand to
share spent of work training unskilled employment project one day a poor
Variable on labor created days wages to women costs of work person
ANC vote share 0.172 0.475 –0.029 –0.060 –16.15 –0.152 –0.562 –5.45
(1.05) (0.65) (0.03) (0.15) (0.91) (0.26) (1.32) (0.45)
Racial fractionalization 0.180 –1.105 –1.176 0.303 56.48 –1.323 –0.392 –12.99
(0.67) (0.72) (0.88) (1.13) (0.97) (1.92)* (0.51) (1.63)
F test on joint  1.22 0.31 0.87 0.69 0.64 2.52 0.93 1.37
significance of racial 
fractionalization and 
vote share
Notes: Additional variables included but not reported are log projected project duration, type of infrastructure built, district mean wages, un-
employment, poverty (P0) rate, percent households feeling safe or very safe, and location dummies. Absolute values of t statistics are
in parentheses. Standard errors account for clustering at the magisterial district level. * Significant at the 10 percent level; ** signifi-
cant at the 5 percent level. Sample size is 98.First although each program had its own
stated set of location criteria,21 none of the
programs explicitly state that they use socio-
economic data to determine which areas
should be prioritized and only two pro-
grams (encompassing 7 percent of our sam-
ple) mentioned infrastructure needs as a
targeting requirement. Second, no locality
received funding for more than one project
within a program but programs paid no
attention to what other development project
funding the locality received. Third, in
separate work, Adato and Haddad (2002)
systematically examine the relationship be-
tween locality and project selection, and
characteristics of the districts in which these
projects are sited. They find no evidence of
any systematic relationship between these.
All these observations suggest that projects
were allocated to localities in a somewhat
unsystematic fashion and that, therefore,
concerns regarding nonrandom placement
of interventions in selected communities are
not warranted here.
Estimation Strategy
Given the discussion above, we adopt the fol-
lowing estimation strategy. We will estimate
the determinants of seven different measures
of project performance: the share of the proj-
ect budget allocated to labor; the log of the
number of days of work created; the log of
the number of training days undertaken; the
ratio of the daily project wage to the local
unskilled wage; the percentage of employ-
ment that goes to women; the log cost in
rands of creating one day of employment;
and the cost to the government of transfer-
ring one rand to the poor.
We control for project characteristics
that might affect these measures: projected
duration and type of asset being created
(construction of community buildings, con-
struction of basic infrastructure). We will
control for locality characteristics that might
have an independent effect on project out-
comes: log mean local wages for comparable
semiskilled work; the local unemployment
rate; the locality’s poverty rate; and the per-
centage of households reporting that they
feel safe or very safe. Lastly, we include
regional dummy variables (regions are geo-
graphical entities smaller than a province
but larger than a district) to capture regional
fixed effects. With these covariates, we will
estimate models (1) and (2).
Basic Results
Estimates of (1) and (2) are reported in
Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. We have grouped
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Table 4.5 Parameter estimates for the first stage residual in the determinants of project performance
Attaining program objectives Distribution of benefits Cost-effectiveness
Ratio:
Log Project Ratio: Cost Cost of
Project number Log wage to overruns to Log cost transferring
budget of days number of the local Percentage planned of creating one rand to
share spent of work training unskilled employment project one day a poor
Variable on labor created days wages to women costs of work person
Residual 0.109 –0.471 –0.389 0.194 74.21 –1.132 –0.258 –11.11
(0.29) (0.35) (0.29) (0.72) (1.40) (1.16) (0.24) (0.98)
Notes: Additional variables included but not reported are de facto community participation, log projected project duration, type of infra-
structure built, district mean wages, unemployment, poverty (P0) rate, percent households feeling safe or very safe, and location dum-
mies. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors account for clustering at the magisterial district level. * Signif-
icant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level. Sample size is 98.these tables according to type of perform-
ance measure being considered. Table 4.6
looks at the impact of participation on the
attainment of project objectives. Table 4.7
looks at the measure of the distribution of
project benefits and Table 4.8 examines as-
pects of cost-effectiveness.
Treating participation as exogenous, par-
ticipation has a statistically significant, pos-
itive effect on the project budget share spent
on labor and the log number of training
days undertaken. Treating participation as
endogenous, participation has a statistically
significant, positive effect on the project
budget share spent on labor, the log number
of days of work created and the log num-
ber of training days undertaken. It increases
the percentage of employment that goes to
women and is associated with a reduction in
the ratio of the project wage to local un-
skilled wages. It reduces the cost of creating
employment and reduces the cost of trans-
ferring income to the poor.
Robustness Checks and 
Additional Results
A concern we had in developing these re-
sults was that our measure of community
participation was picking up the impact of
some other locality characteristic. For this
reason, in preliminary work we added a wide
range of locality characteristics to these spec-
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Table 4.6 The impact of participation on attainment of project performance
Project budget share Log number of Log number of
spent on labor days of work created training days
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
De facto participation 0.069 0.160 0.702 1.180 0.625 1.251
(2.19)** (1.71)* (1.13) (2.53)** (0.76) (1.85)*
Project characteristics
Log planned duration –0.029 –0.023 1.450 1.535 1.239 1.295
(0.74) (0.74) (8.15)** (10.10)** (5.11)** (6.09)**
Constructs community buildings –0.425 –0.422 –0.277 –0.265 0.457 0.512
(7.48)** (8.63)** (0.62) (1.08) (1.65) (1.51)
Constructs basic infrastructure –0.382 –0.381 –0.429 –0.410 –0.425 –0.392
(6.58)** (7.68)** (1.64) (1.66)* (2.37)** (1.15)
Locality characteristics
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.001 –0.026 –0.029 –0.029 –0.036
(0.36) (0.20) (1.14) (1.07) (0.77) (0.97)
Log average wages –0.176 –0.179 –0.761 –0.775 1.289 1.279
(2.15)** (1.77)* (1.99)* (1.54) (1.61) (1.89)*
District poverty (P0) rate –0.463 –0.448 –1.744 –1.660 2.933 2.893
(2.86)** (1.93)* (1.61) (1.43) (1.26) (1.75)*
Percentage of households reporting  –0.002 –0.001 –0.044 –0.038 –0.023 –0.018
that they feel safe or very safe (1.16) (0.44) (3.44)** (3.00)** (2.00)* (1.14)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio –0.089 –0.470 –0.558
(1.33) (1.42) (1.21)
Chi squared statistic, all regressors 112.63** 189.58** 92.51**
R2 0.508 0.649
Notes: (1) is basic specification; (2) is a “treatments” regression with community participation treated as endogenous. Absolute values of t sta-
tistics are in parentheses for specification (1). Absolute values of z statistics are in parentheses for specification (2). Standard errors
are robust to cluster effects at the magisterial district level. * Significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level.
Magisterial district dummy variables for Metropolitan Cape Town and Winelands are included but not reported. Sample size is 98 for
budget share and days work created, 86 for days training created.ifications. These characteristics included: av-
erage household size; proportion of female
headed households; the percent of individ-
uals that have completed standard 5 and
standard 10 of schooling (standard 10 is the
equivalent of completing high school);
mean per capita incomes; the standard devi-
ation of per capita incomes; the standard
deviation of male and female wages; quality
of infrastructure; the proportion of house-
holds who report that they are unable to feed
their children; the district rate of unemploy-
ment; the district rate of long-term (greater
than one year) unemployment; proportion
of adults by occupational class; housing
quality (size, building materials, sanitation);
levels of home ownership; access to water,
electricity, telephones, transport, and health
facilities; and reported levels of crime. None
of these variables had explanatory power,
thus they are not used in the results reported.
We experimented with different controls
for project location; again doing so had no
meaningful impact on the results reported
here. Finally, we included a set of dummy
variables that reflected our subjective as-
sessment of the quality of the project level
data we had obtained. These had no statisti-
cal significance and their inclusion does not
substantively alter our results.
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Table 4.7 The impact of participation on the distribution of project benefits
Ratio: Project wage to Percentage employment
the local unskilled wages to women
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2)
De facto participation –0.131 –0.209 14.42 17.79
(1.45) (2.19)** (2.29)** (1.69)*
Project characteristics
Log planned duration –0.011 –0.017 3.894 4.144
(0.20) (0.56) (1.42) (1.21)
Constructs community buildings –0.149 –0.151 –24.895 –24.808
(5.69)** (3.01)** (9.07)** (4.51)**
Constructs basic infrastructure –0.037 –0.041 –20.319 –20.185
(0.75) (0.80) (5.79)** (3.63)**
Locality characteristics
Unemployment rate –0.001 –0.0004 –0.868 –0.890
(0.17) (0.07) (1.36) (1.48)
Log average wages –0.602 –0.599 –2.131 –2.227
(9.80)** (5.81)** (0.17) (0.20)
District poverty (P0) rate –0.383 –0.398 –3.900 –3.308
(2.59)** (1.67)* (0.08) (0.13)
Percentage of households reporting  –0.005 –0.006 –0.402 –0.364
that they feel safe or very safe (2.32)** (2.36)** (3.77)** (1.27)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 0.077 –3.323
(1.12) (0.43)
Chi squared statistic, all regressors 80.96** 58.64**
R2 0.415 0.330
Notes: (1) is basic specification; (2) is a “treatments” regression with community participation treated as en-
dogenous. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses for specification (1). Absolute values of z sta-
tistics are in parentheses for specification (2). Standard errors are robust to cluster effects at the magis-
terial district level. * Significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level. Magisterial
district dummy variables for Metropolitan Cape Town and Winelands are included but not reported. Sam-
ple size is 98.We experimented with the inclusion of
other variables that we believed might af-
fect community participation. These in-
cluded measures of economic stratification
(such as the standard deviation of earnings;
levels of unemployment; percentage of indi-
viduals in different occupations; levels and
severity of poverty); political fractionaliza-
tion, derived in the same manner as the index
of ethnic fractionalization and drawing on
information on the shares of votes obtained
by different political parties and measures of
community access to infrastructure (such as
distance to various facilities; access to tele-
phones); and other measures of political ac-
tivity, such as voter turnout and the identity
of the party that controlled the local council.
None of these variables had explanatory
power in the regressions used to predict the
probability of participation and hence their
exclusion does not affect our results.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the relationship
between different types of community partic-
ipation and the performance of public works
projects. We develop some simple analytics
that are used to motivate the empirical analy-
sis of the impact of participation on the effi-
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Table 4.8 The impact of participation on project cost-effectiveness
Log cost of creating Cost of transferring one
one day of work rand to a poor person
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2)
De facto participation –0.438 –0.909 –3.841 –8.045
(1.43) (2.78)** (1.56) (2.66)**
Project characteristics
Log planned duration 0.117 0.082 –0.210 –0.522
(1.52) (0.77) (0.16) (0.53)
Constructs community buildings 0.714 0.702 3.380 3.272
(3.13)** (4.10)** (2.79)** (2.06)**
Constructs basic infrastructure 0.927 0.908 3.165 3.000
(6.27)** (5.24)** (3.93)** (1.87)*
Locality characteristics
Unemployment rate 0.026 0.030 –0.418 –0.390
(1.74)* (1.58) (1.74) (2.24)**
Log average wages 0.806 0.819 0.267 0.386
(1.96)* (2.32)** (0.09) (0.12)
District poverty (P0) rate 1.037 0.955 –1.418 –2.155
(1.12) (1.18) (0.55) (0.29)
Percentage of households reporting 0.017 0.011 0.004 –0.043
that they feel safe or very safe (3.91)** (1.28) (0.11) (0.53)
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 0.464 4.141
(2.10)** (2.00)**
Chi squared statistic, all regressors 93.58** 42.34**
R2 0.455 0.224
Notes: (1) is basic specification; (2) is a “treatments” regression with community participation treated as en-
dogenous. Absolute values of t statistics are in parentheses for specification (1). Absolute values of z
statistics are in parentheses for specification (2). Standard errors are robust to cluster effects at the mag-
isterial district level. * Significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level. Magisterial
district dummy variables for Metropolitan Cape Town and Winelands are included but not reported.
Sample size is 98. cacy of public works interventions in the
Western Cape. The empirical implications
of our model are straightforward: (1) we
should expect to see an empirical difference
between programs that are community
managed and those that are purely govern-
ment run; (2) there is no direct link between
the cost of delivering benefits in a program
and whether a program is community run.
We could easily find community managed
programs that have more or less cost per
unit in equilibrium because of changes in
objectives. Formally testing these impli-
cations is, however, challenging. For a
reasonably large number of interventions,
we need information about the extent of
community participation, the level of ben-
efits to the community, the distribution of
benefits within the community, and indica-
tors of cost effectiveness. Further, such data,
while necessary, are not sufficient. Project
performance might also be affected by lo-
cality characteristics and so we need addi-
tional data that can control for these. Lastly,
the fact that in our model financiers choose
to work with community-based organiza-
tions implies that we cannot necessarily
assume that community participation is
exogenous and so our data must also be rich
enough to take this potential endogeneity
into account.
We find that de facto participation has a
statistically significant, positive effect on the
project budget share spent on labor, the log
number of days of work created, and the
log number of training days undertaken. It in-
creases the percentage of employment that
goes to women and is associated with a re-
duction in the ratio of the project wage to
local unskilled wages. It reduces the cost of
creating employment and reduces the cost
of transferring income to the poor. The mag-
nitudes of these impacts are sizeable. These
finding are robust to a variety of model
specifications and the inclusion of other
covariates.
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Community Participation in the
Western Cape Projects
W
hile the econometric work in the previous chapter shows the effects that commu-
nity participation had on a range of project outcomes, it does not tell us why such
effects were found. To get inside the “black box” of community participation, this
chapter uses the case study analysis to examine the forms of community participation in the
eight case study projects, both intended and actual, and discusses their implications—the ben-
efits and consequences of different levels and types of participation.
The Case Study Projects
This section provides an overview of the eight project-level case studies. These case studies
involved in-depth investigations of the institutional arrangements, actors involved, and pro-
cesses that occurred in the course of planning and implementation of each project. Although
extensive qualitative data collection is what distinguishes the case studies from the rest of the
public works dataset, as a subset of the 101 projects quantitative data were also collected.
Table 5.1 provides quantitative characteristics and performance of each of the eight proj-
ects, comparing this performance to the average for the different asset categories. As noted in
Chapter 3, the case studies were selected to be roughly proportional to the full dataset
with respect to institutional arrangements, rural/urban location, and infrastructure type. Both
the selection on institutional arrangements and the secondary level of selection that considered
in more detail the role of government, NGOs, CBOs, and consultants were intended to cap-
ture variation in de jure and de facto participation.
With respect to de facto participation outcomes, there were three case studies with very
high to high levels of participation (Lutzville—the highest, Thembalethu, and Clanwilliam);
two cases of medium-level participation (Khayelitsha and Langa);22 two cases of medium-low
participation (Stellenbosch and Kylemore); and one case of no participation (Murraysburg).
Table 5.2 shows this case study stratification compared to that of the total project database, in-
dicating a roughly reasonable reflection of the different categories, with the category of no par-
ticipation under-represented. However, it is important to point out again that the case studies
are not intended to be statistically representative of the full dataset, but rather to capture vari-
ation that provides insights into a range of issues and conditions, taking a close look at the
processes behind each of these outcomes.
22As explained in Chapter 3, the Khayelitsha project was actually two projects and thus we actually studied three
cases of medium-level participation.
38Table 5.1 Quantitative indicators for the eight case study projects
Distribution of 
Attainment of project performance project benefits Project cost-effectiveness
Ratio:
Project Number Project Cost of
budget share Person of person wage to Log cost of transferring
Form of spent on years years of local Percentage creating one rand to
community Duration labor of work training unskilled employment one day a poor
Project name Project activity participation (days) (percent) created undertaken wages to women of work person
Lutzville Community center (CBPWP) Highest 120 24 11.1 0.7 1.00 11.6 4.73 12.2
All projects constructing community centers 339 30.2 34.7 3.8 0.71 14.4 4.57 8.5
Khayelitsha 4C Roads and stormwater drainage (Pilot) Medium 330 14.3 54.6 3.9 0.54 18.0 5.27 6.7
Khayelitsha 3A Roads and stormwater drainage (Pilot) Medium 520 11.9 130.9 5.1 0.54 4.9 5.49 7.5
Thembaletu Stormwater and roads (Trans) Very high 390 28.2 73.3 4.2 1.26 40.0 5.91 8.0
Clanwilliam Stormwater drainage (CBPWP) High 180 20.1 13.2 0.5 0.71 10.1 5.11 8.2
Murraysburg Water reticulation (CBPWP) None 240 17.3 19.4 0 1.04 0 5.31 7.9
All basic infrastructure (road, storm sewers,  236 34.8 27.1 1.9 0.81 20.1 4.75 8.5
sanitation sewers, and water reticulation)
Langa Clean and green (CAG) Medium 330 52.9 51.6 44.3 0.42 60.0 3.80 3.7
Stellenboscha Remove alien vegetation (FWCP) Medium 390 92.2 210.1 2.2 0.69 43.9 3.61 2.5
Other projects (removal of alien vegetation and  329 70.4 141.7 5.9 0.85 40.2 4.00 5.2
general cleaning and greening)
aData are not available for Kylemore because at the time the database was constructed, the Stellenbosch project included Kylemore (prior to our case studies it was split into a separate project with sep-
arate managers and committees).With respect to the main performance
variables considered in Chapter 4, the Lutz-
ville project with the highest level of de
facto participation performed close to the
average for all projects in its class of infra-
structure (community halls) with respect to
labor intensity (budget share spent on labor),
employment for women, and efficiency in
creating work and transferring income to
the poor. The Thembalethu project, with a
very high level of participation, performed
close to the average in its class of infra-
structure (roads, storm sewers, and water
reticulation) with respect to labor intensity,
and efficiency in creating work and trans-
ferring income to the poor. However, it per-
formed at twice the average participation in
giving employment to women. The Clan-
william project with a high level of partici-
pation performed far below the average with
respect to labor intensity23 and employment
of women, but at the average for efficiency
in creating work and transferring income
to the poor. The Khayelitsha project with
a medium level of de facto participation
performed far below average with respect to
labor intensity; at the average for employing
women in one of the two projects (the one
completed on time) but far below in the other
project; and at the average for efficiency in
creating work and transferring income to the
poor. Langa, the other project with medium
level participation, performed below average
(for “cleaning and greening” projects) in
labor intensity; above average in employing
women; and at around average in efficiency
in creating work and transferring income
to the poor. The Stellenbosch/Kylemore
projects performed above average in labor
intensity; at average in employing women
and efficiency in creating work; but some-
what below average in transferring income
to the poor. Although there were some vari-
ations from the average (some of which is
explained in the following two chapters), on
the whole these project outcomes are reason-




Funds for public works projects were allo-
cated to government or nongovernment
providers representing a geographic entity,
usually a local level political and adminis-
trative unit (under the system in place at the
time the program was initiated). Program
financiers in the central government required
the participation of a community-based or-
ganization. In the South African context
this meant a civic association, RDP Forum,
or project committee composed of commu-
nity members. These were nongovernmental,
though Project Steering Committees (PSCs)
were sometimes composed of both local
government officials and other community
members. These CBOs were supposed to be
representative of the broader community. In
most (though not all) cases they were elected
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23One of the stakeholders commented that the engineers on the project did not present any options for labor-
intensive construction.
Table 5.2 Comparison of de facto participation in the case study
and full project database
Case studies All projects
De facto Case studies (percent (percent
participation (no.) of total) of total)
Highest-high 3 37.5 44.44
Medium-low 3 37.5 24.24
None 1 12.5 31.31bodies. Community participation in the pub-
lic works projects then had two main dimen-
sions: (1) participation of the community at
large through mass meetings involving con-
sultation or decisionmaking; and (2) par-
ticipation of representative members of the
community in a CBO, often in the form of a
PSC. (PSC is used here to represent all types
of community-based project committees/
organizations, which varied in structure and
name between programs and projects).
While roles given to the community at
large or to a CBO/PSC were sometimes
clearly differentiated, the meaning of the
term “community” is often blurred. When
program stakeholders refer to “the commu-
nity” they are sometimes referring to com-
munity residents in general, sometimes to the
PSC, other times imprecisely to both. “Com-
munity” is a problematic term in several re-
spects. Bozzoli (1987) problematizes com-
munity in the South African context, placing
it within its apartheid history. “Community”
was long used to signal race by the apartheid
government, but also became part of the dis-
course of resistance movements. “Commu-
nity” signals inclusion and solidarity, but is
simultaneously exclusionary. Reference to
“the community” can obscure divisions of
race, class, gender, political affiliation, and
other differences. As Lund (no date, refer-
ring to Bozzoli 1987) points out, commu-
nity is not a static variable: “actually exist-
ing residential areas will at different times,
and in the face of different threats, and under
certain conditions, organize collectively, with
a real sense of community, but always ex-
cluding some groups and including others.”
The question of who in the community is
represented or excluded by a PSC or local
government is discussed in Chapter 6.
All the role-players in the eight projects
studied, including financiers, providers (in
government, the private sector, NGOs, and
community groups), and beneficiaries agreed
that community participation in some form
is essential to the functioning of public works
projects. In contrast to the past when the
state engaged in top-down planning and
implementation, the community was seen
by all as an indispensable player, although
there were vastly different perceptions of its
appropriate roles—from the view that com-
munities should be able to run projects on
their own and that even where this might
lead to financial disaster this is still an im-
portant learning experience (interview, for-
mer NGO staff, Langa project), to others
who felt that participation does not have
much place once construction is underway
(interviews, contractor, construction firm
on Khayelitsha project; official, DTPW). The
reality of community participation in his ex-
perience was explained by the assistant city
engineer for Khayelitsha (the implementing
agent/provider for the Khayelitsha Pilot
projects):
I believe that we have to involve the
community. It’s the way that this com-
munity works . . . so one has to respect
that and take cognizance of it and ac-
commodate it. And if you don’t do it in
any case, if you think it’s going to take
longer because you’ve got to consult a
committee, you’re making a big mis-
take. Because if they don’t want you to
do it, you won’t do it—you won’t get
the job going. They24 will just come
around and make a lot of trouble. And
if I were them I’d most probably do it
myself, as well. You know, I’m sitting
in a shack down there, and there might
be a job opportunity here, and no-one
consults me or my representative. We
have to walk the extra mile, we have to
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24Interpretations of “they” is a frequent theme in this research. The idea of African, colored, and white commu-
nities as “different” or “other”—views based on historical racial relationships, lack of familiarity and under-
standing, and stereotyped discourse—shaped responses to these programs, responses to the “other,” and their
receptiveness to participation of the “other.” This point is elaborated, with examples, in Chapter 6.go there, and get them on board. And
we do that, or we try to do that, in any
case . . . it works generally. People25
tend to see the whole community partic-
ipation process I think also in the wrong
light. They feel these guys are interfer-
ing in the process and they don’t know
anything about it. Yes, they don’t
know anything about it—but they
want to know about it (interview, engi-
neer, Lingulethu West City Council).
The tradition of participation in urban
communities—not just in civic organiza-
tions but also groups involved with service
delivery—can be traced through the his-
tory of activism and community consultation
through civic organizations that became an
important feature of the urban landscape in
the mid-1980s. The organizations often en-
gaged in both antiapartheid activism and
service delivery in communities where the
state was not delivering services (Seekings
1988; Lodge 1991). However, expectations
of community consultation are not con-
fined to urban environments. In the small
mostly Afrikaaner and “coloured” town of
Lutzville in the rural northwest corner of the
province, the town clerk explained that
community participation even at the design
stage is “very important because if the com-
munity is not satisfied with the design and
you spend R3 million, it won’t be a satis-
factory building. That, one must clearly
understand.” (interview acting town clerk,
Lutzville).
Although there is increasing recogni-
tion of the importance or at least the in-
evitability of participation, in practice pro-
viders in Western Cape provincial and local
governments continued to view infrastruc-
ture delivery as a matter of technical expert-
ise and were slow to hand over real respon-
sibility to community members. The findings
of our database of 101 projects show that
although all programs had an emphasis on
community participation in program design,
CBOs ran approximately 30 percent of the
projects.26
Types of Participation
from the Case Studies
Through the case studies, we identified a
number of areas as actual and potential areas
in which projects did or can benefit from
community participation—from infrastruc-
ture selection to project design and manage-
ment. Table 5.3 shows how each project
actually performed in relation to types of
participation that could potentially have in-
volved the community as a whole27—where
the wider community/beneficiaries (not just
a PSC) take on some aspects of the provider
role. The gray boxes indicate that participa-
tion did take place in this area. The check-
ered boxes indicate that there were mixed
responses, with either significant differences
of opinion or a circumstance not possible to
simplify with a positive or negative answer.
The white boxes indicate that participation
did not take place. The FWWP projects have
“n.a.” in some categories where the design
of the program made the question not appli-
cable. Lutzville had the greatest degree of
broad community/beneficiary involvement,
with the community as a whole involved in
selecting the asset; electing a CBO/provider;
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25“People” here refers to other white professionals in government and the private sector. The informant speaking
is also a member of this group, reflecting critically on these relationships.
26Anational evaluation commissioned by DPW of the CBPWPranked Western Cape among the three lowest per-
forming provinces (out of the nine) in terms of participation, using primarily the criteria involvement in choice
of project, planning, financial decisionmaking, and knowledge of maintenance (Everatt et al. 1997). The CASE
evaluation sampled only three projects from the province and thus is not representative. However, it does appear
to be consistent with the findings from our dataset.
27This of course does not imply that virtually everyone in the community participates, but that a community
forum enabling broad participation took place. There will always be people who either do not want or are not able
to participate for a variety of reasons. This issue of choosing not to participate is taken up later in this chapter.Table 5.3 Types of participation where broad community involvement occurred
Level of participation Lutzville Langa Khayelitsha Thembalethu Clanwilliam Murraysburg Kylemore Stellenbosch
Community helped  n.a. n.a.
select asset
Community felt  n.a. n.a.
asset a good choice




Community contributed  n.a. n.a.
to project design
Adequate communi-
cation with community 
during project
Community had sense 
of ownership
Notes: PSC indicates Project Steering Committee; CBO, community-based organization; n.a. indicates that, due to program design, the ques-
tion was not applicable.
Broad community participation did not occur.
Broad community participation occurred.
Results were mixed, with either significant differences of opinion or complex circumstances not able to be characterized as
simply positive or negative.
receiving adequate communication from
providers; and reporting a sense of project
and asset ownership. Murraysburg had the
lowest degree of broad community partici-
pation, where the wider community agreed
after the fact that the asset was a good
choice, but no further communication took
place between providers and beneficiaries.
Selection of Infrastructure
As suggested earlier, community partici-
pation can potentially secure a better dis-
tribution of benefits. Broad community/
beneficiary involvement in the selection of
infrastructure has three main advantages:
(a) assets are chosen that are in line with
community priorities, (b) access to those as-
sets can be more equitable, and (c) greater
awareness of the cost trade-offs of different
choices is generated among the community.
The NPWP states that communities
should be involved with choosing the type
of asset on which to spend public works
funds. It also recognizes that governments
(in the role of financier or provider) have
additional or different considerations to the
needs of communities/beneficiaries in prior-
itizing projects, and if priorities conflict,
“the needs of the community must be rec-
onciled with government planning” (DPW
1994, 10). In four of the 18 CBPWP proj-
ects, community facilitators contracted by
DTPW28 found that local government had
chosen projects that were not the highest
priority for the community, and following
a process of consultation, the project type
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28In the framework of Chapter 4, community facilitators were agents of the financiers, helping to assure that
providers more closely represented their priorities, in this case greater community participation.was changed (interview, C. B. Associates).29
Community involvement can also help cor-
rect for bias that local government may
have with respect to one constituency. How-
ever, a better outcome could also be
achieved if a community decisionmaking
process is facilitated by local government.
Local government may have information that
communities are unaware of; for example,
plans may be underway or funding already
allocated to certain kinds of infrastructure,
making another type of asset a better choice,
or there may be environmental or health im-
plications associated with one type of asset
compared with another. Of 101 projects in
the Western Cape, 22 were community halls.
It is not possible to know whether these were
really the highest infrastructure need of the
communities that requested them. Adato and
Haddad (2002) show how consultant engi-
neers, many of whom favored building com-
munity halls, positioned themselves to get
access to project contracts. Access to good
information is an important factor in facili-
tating successful community participation.
Choices of infrastructure have equity
implications often reflecting power relation-
ships in the communities. A decision to
build the stormwater system in Clanwilliam
meant that the “coloured” community of
Cedarville received the benefits, rather than
the African community of “Khayelitsha 2,”
the new squatter area for which an alter-
native project was initially planned for ablu-
tion blocks30 until it was later changed. The
ablution block project was abandoned be-
cause people were not living on the sites
yet, because this could have been funded by
housing subsidies, and because “the com-
munity” decided the higher priority was the
storm water project (interview, C. B. Asso-
ciates). It may be that the ablution block
project would not have been a good choice
(when these were eventually built people
did not move to the site). However, this case
cautions against seeing “the community”
as one entity, as residents of Khayelitsha 2
and Cedarville had different interests. The
former may not want to use their housing
subsidies for a project otherwise paid for,
may have had other ideas for infrastructure
they wanted, and did not benefit from the
choice of the stormwater project. Commu-
nity participation can embody and exacerbate
inequities depending on who participates,
and is thus not a guaranteed protection
against one part of the community capturing
the benefits.
One role of provincial department facil-
itators (as agents for financiers or providers)
can be to monitor this process to increase
its inclusiveness. An inclusive participation
process for choosing the type of asset to be
built can minimize the possibility of having
the benefits captured by a less poor part of
the community, or at least bring these choices
out into the open. This can also help to min-
imize conflict later on: in Khayelitsha, the
decision by the municipality to build roads
in one part of the section and not another
(meaning also that jobs were not created
there), later led to the disruption of the
project. Bringing community leaders into a
decisionmaking process, where the facts of
limited funds and difficult choices are dis-
cussed, could avoid this kind of problem—
“could” rather than “would,” because the
need for resources in poor communities can
overpower negotiated agreements (as in the
case of workers who agree to a wage rate
and then strike afterwards).
Understanding Cost Implications
Community involvement in the choice of in-
frastructure also means people will be aware
that choices also involve costs. In Murrays-
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29Note that all programs had varying boundaries around the type of project that could be chosen, with FWWP the
most limited, the CAG limited to environmental clean-up, and the Pilot and Transport projects limited to roads.
The most flexible were the infrastructure projects of the CBPWP, CEP, and WCEDF.
30Ablution blocks are normally buildings with toilets and running water, sometimes sinks and baths or showers.burg, project workers (from the community)
said they were having difficulty paying the
new water bills that came with household
taps (installed by the project) instead of com-
munal taps. As one of the Murraysburg local
councillors explained it, there was inade-
quate communication on the need to pay for
water: “The only thing they went for is to
get more water, but they didn’t realize that
they had to pay more for the water” (inter-
view). Although some responses indicated
that people would prefer the taps but needed
to understand the costs, one comment at the
workshop was that
there are people who are looking back
to the old street taps because now the
big accounts are coming to them even
with lawyers letters. And there are peo-
ple who are saying: “why should I pay
for water that comes from God?” and
all these types of things. When the taps
were installed people were happy but
now that they see what they have to pay
for it they are not longer so happy (proj-
ect worker, Murraysburg workshop).
As Table 5.3 indicates, lack of participa-
tion does not mean that the community dis-
agrees with the choice. In four of the six
cases, the PSC and workers felt that the asset
was a good choice (though not necessarily
the best) and in the remaining two no dis-
satisfaction was found. The two FWWP
projects were by definition alien vegetation
clearing and thus did not involve any proj-
ect choice.31 However, in both Kylemore
and Stellenbosch, workers did express that
they were not consulted on the type of proj-
ect and that basic infrastructure and hous-
ing were higher community needs. Although
alien vegetation clearing does increase water
resources, this does not directly affect the
workers’communities, so it is not surprising
that they would see infrastructure as a higher
priority. However, they are not considering
the scale of job creation, and it is very pos-
sible that with this information, they might
choose alien vegetation clearing. This again
implies the importance of good information
(for example, on relative job creation and
skill development potential of different in-
frastructure choices) communicated by pro-
viders to beneficiaries if the latter are to par-
ticipate in selecting between asset types.
Under the re-aligned CBPWPthat DPW
introduced in 1998, community-based steer-
ing committees have co-responsibility for
project identification, along with local gov-
ernment. Unlike project management and
other implementation issues, this is an area
where the PSC can facilitate the participa-
tion of the wider community.
Community Representation
The main way that the community partici-
pates in projects is through a project steering
committee (PSC), the mechanism through
which the community becomes the provider.
Thus the degree to which the committee is
representative of the broader community be-
comes an important proxy for community
participation in an ongoing capacity. In five
of the eight cases, projects had steering com-
mittees that were elected by the community
—either pre-existing community organiza-
tions such as street committees or RDP fo-
rums, or project steering committees
formed for this project but chosen through
these existing structures. More fragmented
communities may result in less representa-
tive steering committees, particularly where
mechanisms do not exist to resolve conflicts.
This was clearly the case in Thembalethu.
The legitimacy of Thembalethu’s commit-
tee, where community members had been
appointed from among the leadership of
the controversial Thembalethu Development
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31The program only involves one type of project and takes place far outside of communities where the relevant
species are found. The equity issues arise only in determining where to locate the project in terms of which com-
munities will obtain employment.Trust, was disputed and this is reflected in
the many conflicts that arose in the course
of the project, with the committee some-
times at the center of the conflict rather than
mediating.
Where communities are politically highly
fragmented, like in Thembalethu, Clan-
william, and Murraysburg, it is particularly
important that project committees are elected.
As a key role player from the Clanwilliam
municipality put it, “what is very important
is the committee is representative of all the
role players. In that way, half of the problem
is solved. If this process is not in order there
is problems” (interview).
Community Input into 
Project Design
This falls into stage 2 and 3 of Paul’s (1987)
categorization of types of participation. In
South Africa, this was a highly contested area
with regard to the benefits of community
input/decisionmaking. Project design in-
volves many—though not solely—technical
decisions: in a road project, for example, it
would include the type of road built; the
materials and machines used; the shape and
size of the road and other features; the type
of training. Two CBPWP directors in the
province, one with extensive experience
facilitating community participation, said
that communities tend not to be that inter-
ested in project design, generally preferring
to leave that to those with technical training.
Using participatory research methods in the
study workshops, project workers listed all
tasks in their project and then chose the role
players they thought should be responsible
for those tasks. Out of seven workshops, in
only one did workers mention project de-
sign as a task in the project (much less
something that workers or the PSC should
be responsible for). It is important to note
that these were project workers/community
members; PSC members would have been
more likely to mention design.
At the same time, participation does in-
volve opportunity costs, and it is possible
that communities will opt out of participat-
ing in a given area. Participation takes time
and interest, and not everyone will prioritize
this use of their time or have this interest.32
In several of the case studies, individuals on
the PSC tended to be those who were on
other committees and played other leader-
ship roles in the community—those individ-
uals for whom participation in development
or political processes was a priority. These
individuals also tended to be more educated
and skilled, and thus more likely to have
access to employment and alternative uses
for their time—contradicting the opportunity
cost argument. Nevertheless, the fact that
many people do not come to meetings or
volunteer to join the PSC implies an oppor-
tunity cost, financial or otherwise. In cases
where PSC members are remunerated for
their time—some projects recognized the
cost of participation—there is of course
more interest in joining—presenting greater
opportunities for conflict over these posi-
tions. But in these South African communi-
ties with very high unemployment and few
resources to access, the opportunity costs
of participation are relatively low33 and the
interest in monitoring the use of resources
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32Writing on the issue of infrastructure maintenance, Ostrom, Shroeder, and Wynne (1990) discuss opportunity
costs in terms of the investment of resource inputs, particularly time and labor, that must be exceeded by the per-
ceived benefits.
33In industrialized countries with high employment and more abundant resources, there is less interest in partic-
ipating, and the chances of getting a mass turnout to a meeting about a road project is low. The city engineer for
the Khayelitsha project observed this in commenting on the strong interest in participation and large meeting
turnouts in Khayelitsha and the contrast with his own white, middle class community: “It’s not the way that we
work. I mean if [my town of] Somerset West wants to build a park [next] to my house, I believe they know what
they’re doing and they’re doing it the right way, and they’ve planned it properly—so I don’t worry about it too
much” (interview, engineer, Lingelethu West Development Council).is high—this is evidenced by the large turn-
outs to mass meetings.
Taking into account varied levels of in-
terest, there are several reasons for getting
community input during the project design
phase. It is likely that as people become
familiar with the implications of design
choices they would be more interested in
participating for these reasons:34
1. Problems can be resolved early avoid-
ing disruption later. Involvement up
front means that if there are problems
raised that need to be resolved, this oc-
curs before the project is underway and
changes become more costly. A com-
munity unhappy with how they see a
project progressing may disrupt it mid-
stream, as they did in the Khayelitsha
project.
2. Design aspects may be more appropri-
ate to community needs and preferences.
Beneficiaries can express design pref-
erences, for example, with respect to
allocation of space in community build-
ings. In Lutzville, the committee helped
to decide on the design of a creche,
kitchen, and meeting hall. In Langa, the
community decided where they wanted
to start with the greening, choosing the
entrance to Langa to create a good first
impression, and to not favor one part of
the community over another. However,
this choice did not benefit the poorest
part of the community, as would an al-
ternative idea to build a small park near
the hostels.
3. Local knowledge can enhance safety,
convenience, and efficiency. Commu-
nity members can contribute ideas that
make a design better (for example,
safer) for the community. In Them-
balethu, residents wanted speed bumps
and taxi pull-offs, pointing out that the
absence of these features created safety
hazards for children and adults (given
how fast taxis and other traffic traveled
on the long straightaway). To control
speed, the South African National Civics
Organization (SANCO) representative
had also proposed a zig-zagging design
rather than a long straightaway. These
suggestions were not adopted by the
providers, for reasons related to cost
and jurisdictions.
4. Access to relevant inside information
about the community can be provided.
In Khayelitsha, the community raised
the point that a brick road would be
vandalized by people taking bricks out
of the road for use as building materials.
This was a point engineers had not real-
ized on their own. In this case the choice
involved a trade-off in labor use as a
brick road would have created more
jobs. Still the community chose paving.
5. Community priorities can be reflected
and trade-offs understood. People can
make decisions involving benefits and
trade-offs that affect their communities.
The consultants at Thembalethu called
a mass meeting where they asked what
type of road they should build. The
community chose bricks instead of
paving, because more jobs would be
created. It also would mean that brick
making skills would be left in the com-
munity, enabling new job opportunities
in the housing construction industry.
The Regional Services Council and taxi
drivers argued against using bricks, and
the consulting engineers told the com-
munity that a brick road would be 35
percent more expensive but would cre-
ate more jobs. The community chose
more jobs (interview, consultant engi-
neer, Thembalethu project). The ability
to participate in these kinds of decisions
in an informed way depends on the
range of choices presented—which will
be shaped by technical, economic, and
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34Participation in design choices can occur through the PSC or through a mass meeting where the PSC solicits
suggestions, as occurred at Thembalethu.political considerations and interests—
and the kind of education that is built
into the process. Explaining how he has
seen the process work in many commu-
nity projects in the past, one DTPW of-
ficial suggested that communities could
benefit more than they currently do if
they did participate in design issues:
The supply of materials, they’re not too
concerned about that. . . . And to me
that’s perhaps a shortcoming because 
in any building construction work . . .
money generally goes for materials.
And if you look at the 60% of it—and
the change in those things—that is
where you actually create more work
. . . Let’s just say a brick [from the fac-
tory] costs you 50 cents and a brick
made on site costs you 55 cents—it
may cost you more, you get less bricks,
you get less building for it, but 80% of
that 55 cents can be money earned by
those participating in brick-making
whereas the entire 50 cents really goes
out of the community. And you know
those kind of understandings cannot be
seen easy because that decision is long
before the bricks arrive. . . . People
must be made aware of where the re-
sources are, how those resources can 
be changed (interview).
Some kinds of projects or infrastructure
are more conducive to community input into
the design than others. In the two FWWP
projects, there is little room for community
participation in project design, as the alien
vegetation removal is standardized. Water
reticulation projects do not lend themselves
to as many choices as a road or a commu-
nity hall, although there are some. In Clan-
william, no design options were discussed
with communities or the PSC, although
there is a wide variation in the labor inten-
sity of different drainage and pipe laying de-
signs (interview, official, DPW). This again
points to the importance of good informa-
tion if communities are to make informed
choices for or against design options that
involve trading off job creation for other
benefits.
The Murraysburg and Khayelitsha cases
serve to illustrate where community partici-
pation in design has to be approached care-
fully. In both cases, community members
expressed their desire for design inputs in
the form of extensions to the project that
were not within the budget. If this occurs,
technical consultants or local authorities can
clarify the limits, and if a design change is
financially infeasible, it will not be done.
However, a discussion around the issue can
enable communities to decide whether they
are willing to trade off one kind of benefit
for another, and leaves people with a better
understanding of why a choice has been
made. This educational process is beneficial
to the community, and to the project by re-
ducing the chance of disgruntlement and
protest later (as occurred in Khayelitsha and
Thembalethu).
One option raised by engineers was  the
use of standardized designs, to save costs and
ensure that certain criteria are met with re-
gards to quality, labor intensity, and cost. If
this route is taken, communities can still have
input through including community repre-
sentatives in forums where design options
are discussed. Context-specific changes
would need to fit local needs.
Communication and 
Community Education
Another way in which beneficiaries can be
seen to participate is through periodic com-
munication from and with providers (Paul’s
[1987] first stage of participation). In the
case studies (and most of the other projects
in the seven programs), once the project is
underway, mass meetings are no longer held
to receive community input, except under
unusual circumstances that significantly and
directly affect beneficiaries—for example, an
unforseen need to remove shacks. Instead,
community participation takes place from
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munity organization becomes the provider,
alone or in partnership with local govern-
ment and/or the private sector. In the re-
search workshops with former project
workers, when they refer to involving “the
community,” they generally were referring
to CBOs such as street committees, SANCO,
and PSCs.
Despite Paul’s (1987) designation of
information sharing as a first stage of par-
ticipation, it is also arguably not participa-
tion if there are no mechanisms for partici-
pants to influence actions. Nevertheless, the
case study projects revealed ways in which
periodic reports given to beneficiaries were
important—on progress of the project, rel-
evant announcements such as upcoming
shack removals or safety hazards, and finan-
cial reports. In Thembalethu, workers said
they would have liked an early meeting with
the consultants to discuss wages, amount of
funds to contractors, type of work tasks, and
contracts, and that there needs to be lines
of communication so there is no breakdown
in understanding between community and
contractor (Thembalethu Workshop). In
Khayelitsha and Thembalethu, workers and
PSC members expressed dissatisfaction
over the absence of financial reporting from
the managing engineers. Aware that a large
sum of money has been given by the gov-
ernment for their benefit, they want to know
how it is being used. Sudden infusions of
project money can breed distrust, and peo-
ple may assume that someone is benefiting
unduly if they do not know how funds are
being spent. A simple financial report given
at intervals can help communities feel more
involved and confident. If periodic reports
are not given, the provider can at a mini-
mum present a final report. As the head of
SANCO in Thembalethu explained it,
you must know what the professional
consultant engineer is getting, what
the quantity surveyor is getting, what the
architect is getting you see. You must
know that at least most of the money
goes back to the community. If there’s
any money perhaps left, it can also start
to do another project you see. That’s a
thing that should happen because [other-
wise] we’ll never know. Because it can
perhaps be that . . . you’ve got a prob-
lem with the project. [Or] perhaps the
project did go smooth and you never
had any problems (interview).
In Thembalethu, community members
and the engineers alike commented on the
problem of communication breakdowns. The
engineers/providers did not explain to the
community why the budget increased by R2
million. There is no evidence that those funds
were not spent legitimately on the project,
but beneficiaries were bound to be suspi-
cious when no explanation was offered. The
fact that no final report was given left long-
standing bad feelings in the community to-
ward the consultants and the provincial
government.35 This makes it harder for
outsiders to subsequently work with this
community.
Communication with beneficiaries is not
just important for its intrinsic democratic
value, but it also has financial implications.
Greater participation can help to foster a
sense of ownership, valuable not only for
the social benefits of instilled pride, but also
helping to prevent theft, vandalism, work
stoppages, and other conflicts. Of the eight
case study projects, a sense of community
ownership was exhibited to some extent at
Khayelitsha, Thembalethu, Clanwilliam,
and Lutzville. While communication helps
to promote ownership, ownership appears
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in response to a request, but were unable to report because of changing memberships of organizations and dis-
putes in the community about which was the appropriate group to report to.to be more closely related to higher levels
of participation. Lutzville, for example, had
the highest levels of participation and peo-
ple said that the community “put their whole
heart and soul in it” because of a sense that
it is “our hall” (interview, PSC head). Aside
from instilling pride, a sense of local owner-
ship has instrumental benefits such as in-
creasing cooperation, improving mainte-
nance, and reducing vandalism.
In the Langa environmental project in-
volving township clean-up and greening,
workers were supposed to be the link with
the wider community through their Street
Committees, but such participation did not
really take place as envisioned. The NGO
provider did not have sufficient time to run
the project and carry out the kind of links
with the community, primarily around envi-
ronmental education, it had hoped for. One
of the project coordinators felt this was a
lost opportunity, because
six months later the dirt was right back
there again. And that just showed we
didn’t address the core, we didn’t talk
to the people who were leaving the
garbage there in the first place. And
that takes time and time take money
(interview, Tsoga representative).
In Khayelitsha, a good community con-
sultation process occurred through the RDP
forums in the early stage of the project, but
later distrust became extremely high due
mainly to conflict around the task system
and other labor-management issues, and a
poor working relationship between the PSC
and the contractor. Now, according to the
PSC, “in a recent community meeting the
people said that [this contractor] was never
going to be taken for any jobs in their
community as it has caused problems and
has left the community in conflict” (inter-
view, PSC).
Murraysburg had no community partic-
ipation and no community steering com-
mittee. One councilor commented that such
projects should do more to empower com-
munities by bringing them through the steps
of a development project, explaining the
types of decisions involved and considera-
tions involved in making them. At the re-
search workshops with former project work-
ers, they were taken through an exercise of
this type, asked to identify who played which
roles on the project and debate who they felt
should play these roles in the future. The
level of interest, energy, and heated argu-
ments generated through these workshop
exercises revealed their value as a learning
process. The benefits may extend beyond
this, making projects run more smoothly if
workers and community members better
understand the rationale for decisions around
wages, why some people should get jobs
before others, or why certain role-players
and not others hold certain types of decision-
making power. The conceptual issues they
introduce and the opportunity for debating
them could be introduced through pre-project
workshops (rather than as an evaluative tool,
as we used them).
The Role of the Project
Steering Committees
While most of the issues discussed above
pertain to forms of participation for com-
munities at large or for smaller representa-
tive groups such as PSCs or CBOs, these
smaller groups are the focal point of most
participation, particularly those forms that
involve capacity building and the assump-
tion of most provider roles. This arrangement
assumes that this small group is indeed rep-
resentative of the beneficiaries—in the vast
majority of cases this group was elected—
and on this basis it is brought into the role of
(partial) provider.36 It is important to stress,
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the community, however. Problems that occur where it is not are discussed in Chapter 6.in referring back to the model in Chapter 4,
that the PSC rarely takes on the full role of
provider, but rather is in this role partially,
along with other role-players such as local
government, consultants, and contractors.
In the 101 Western Cape projects studied,
the PSCs’ roles varied widely, from Paul’s
(1987) lowest to highest levels of participa-
tion. Since in these South African programs
participation was an end as well as a means,
the nature of participation in these projects
is important. The analysis in Chapter 4
considered whether communities were joint
or sole decisionmakers, advisors but not
decisionmakers, or had no participation. The
case studies further disaggregate these roles,
looking more closely at what community-
based organizations actually did or did not do
in the projects, and the effects of these roles.
Table 5.4 shows the responsibilities held
by PSCs in the eight case studies, indicated
by grey shading. The responsibilities of the
other role players are also indicated.
The pattern that emerges from these
studies is that, with the exception of Lutz-
ville, community-based PSCs were not in-
volved with technical managerial tasks. In-
stead, their roles have been primarily related
to labor and community liaison responsibil-
ities, including worker selection, communi-
cation, and conflict resolution. This is where
their skills are strongest and they are most
confident. It is also the area that they tend to
perceive as having the most direct impact
on the community. As one of the DTPW
PWP directors observed:
When it comes to the physical con-
struction work, that is when people
want to participate, for the basic need
that—a job is needed and they would
like to ensure that people that they
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Table 5.4 Responsibilities of role-players in case-study projects
Responsibility Lutzville Langa Khayelitsha Thembalethu Clanwilliam Murraysburg Kylemore Stellenbosch
Implementing agent NGO LG With LG CNC CNC
consultants
Selecting project NGO LG Consultants LG LG CNC CNC
Selecting contractor n.a. LG Consultants LG LG n.a. n.a.






Overseeing contractor n.a. LG, Consultants Consultant n.a. n.a.
consultants
Managing finances NGO LG, Consultants LG LG Project Project 
consultants manager manager
Maintenance LG LG LG LG LG n.a n.a
Notes: LG indicates local government; NGO, nongovernmental organization; CNC, Cape Nature Conservation (the implementing agent for
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry); n.a. indicates that, due to program design, the question was not applicable.
Responsibility held by another agent, as indicated.
Responsibility held by the Project Steering Committee.know within the community, let’s say 
a welder for burglar bars to a door, they
want to make sure that it’s done by the
local guy and not by somebody outside.
And in doing that they ignore the pro-
cess of competition amongst various
service providers . . . it takes the bur-
den of another mouth or few mouths 
to feed off the general community, be-
cause that’s what’s happening in com-
munities . . . they help each other . . .
So their concern is what’s going to hap-
pen to the money, where’s the money
going to? (interview).
Our research workshop findings support
this view. When asked who they thought
should select the workers, former project
workers in five of the eight projects desig-
nated only community members (PSC or
the “community”) for this role, and in the
other three projects this task was to be shared
by the community and contractor or fore-
man. This is also how professionals in the
case studies viewed appropriate roles for
the PSC. The committee is seen mainly in
the role of community liaison: it is impor-
tant for enabling access to work in commu-
nities; for communicating with the com-
munity about relocation, safety, and other
issues with direct impact on inhabitants of
the area; and for mediating conflict within
the community; between the community and
contractor; and between the project workers
and the contractor. These are roles that are
obviously of benefit to the contractors, while
involvement in technical management issues
is less desirable to them.
As seen in Table 5.4, in five of the case
study projects community committees (and
sometimes the community as a whole) were
involved in the worker selection process.
This lets elected community members on
the committee deal with the contentious
equity issues that arise in choosing who
gets jobs and who does not, in communities
where there are far fewer jobs than people
who need them, where whole families are
unemployed and many people have not
worked for a very long time. There is the
potential for patronage, though this did not
arise as an issue in the case studies. It is
important to note, however, that some rep-
resentatives from the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU) object to
this role for community members, because
these union leaders believe this arrangement
drives divisions into communities by making
community members into employers (objec-
tions were even greater to participation in
decisions regarding firing; see Adato and
Haddad 2002). This is one of the dilemmas
posed by the dual identity of community
members as providers and beneficiaries.
Adato and Haddad (2002) discuss how
PSC involvement in selecting workers per-
mits considerations that do not usually enter
into targeting processes for antipoverty
programs—for example, the criterion of
being “active community members” (who
have dedicated time to meetings, activities,
and organizations) was used in the Langa and
Khayelitsha projects—and also introduces
local perceptions of poverty and the most
needy. These criteria do not necessarily re-
sult in the best targeting of the poor, and
may have other disadvantages in terms of
elite capture or underemployment of women
if women have less opportunity to participate
in community activities due to time con-
strains or social biases. But using local cri-
teria can also improve upon a self-targeting
process by choosing those the community
feels are most needy or deserving from
among those who will accept the low wage
(that is, in theory the poorest of the poor),
where demand for the jobs is higher than
those available—almost always the case in
South Africa (Adato and Haddad 2002).
The quantitative data in Chapter 4 found
that de facto participation increased the
amount of employment days for women;
however, infrastructure development and
community building projects typically em-
ployed fewer women than other public works
projects. The case study research helped to
interpret these findings. First, we found a
number of biases against employing women,
52 CHAPTER 5one of the main ones being the perception
that construction was not women’s work.
Several of our case studies showed quite a
bit of bias against hiring women. The Lutz-
ville project, with the highest levels of com-
munity participation, employed only three
women on the community hall project—as
cleaners. However, biases were held in dif-
ferent cases by community members, local
government, and contractors, so community
participation does not necessarily affect this,
and the quantitative results suggest that com-
munity run projects perform better in this
area. Our research found that the main fac-
tor influencing women’s employment was
the emphasis given on targeting women at
the program level, though this was still not
sufficient—these directives were followed
more closely in some programs than others
(Adato et al. 1999). With respect to commit-
tee participation, several of the case studies
had women members but they were consid-
erably underrepresented compared to men.
Lutzville was the one case study where
the project was entirely community-run:
there were weekly community-wide meet-
ings, and a community-based PSC managed
the project with no local government in-
volvement. The DTPW provided some as-
sistance with facilitation, and the PSC man-
aged the contractor. The main feature of
Lutzville West that stands out among the
other case study projects was its high degree
of social capital37—it was a small town with
tightly knit social networks and little appar-
ent political conflict (inter-party or intra-
party), and strongly influenced by its church
committee and its community, church, and
project leader (all the same person).38These
factors seem to explain why there was no
reported conflict on the project (see Chap-
ter 6 for a discussion of the significance of
conflict), and that community participation
was effective. There were no labor disputes,
time or cost overruns, or theft, and negli-
gible vandalism.
Although beneficiaries and most private
sector and government providers gave the
highest value to the worker-selection/com-
munity liaison functions of the community-
based provider, there are benefits to be
derived from community participation in
other areas. Evidence from the case studies
reveals that given the opportunity and skills
to participate in other areas, community
members are interested in doing so.
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE WESTERN CAPE PROJECTS 53
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38Certainly the leadership of this individual was important to the smooth running of the project. However, we do
not attribute participation outcomes primarily to “leadership” as the case study projects had widely variable leader-
ship that does not appear to be very correlated with participation outcomes.CHAPTER 6
Social, Political, and Institutional
Challenges to Participation
I
n this chapter we use the case study material to describe and analyze the extent and nature
of the social, political, and institutional challenges posed to participatory development, as
well as consequences of increasing or limiting participation. In particular we focus on the
project steering committee (PSC), negotiating with other agents that either support or chal-
lenge their role as (partial) provider.
Table 6.1 describes eight reasons that were found to explain why PSCs were not able to
play more substantive roles in the case study projects.
The Views of Professionals on Efficiency
and Technical Specialization
The first three factors in Table 6.1 share a common underlying theme, related to the tension
between participation and professional views on technical specialization.39 In four of the eight
projects, participation was limited by the consultant’s, contractor’s, or local government’s
belief that committees did not have the technical ability to assume greater responsibility.
Government and private sector project managers are accustomed to planning and managing
projects on their own, and are concerned primarily with bringing projects in at high quality
and within budget. These role-players do not have incentives for sharing the provider role with
community members or their representatives. The perception of most is that community par-
ticipation will increase time and costs, and reduce quality. In terms of financial and profes-
sional rewards, their perceived incentives mitigate against participation. The exception to
this is when failure to share this role would disrupt the construction process, but the effect of
this absence is not apparent until after the project is underway. In the competitive process of
tendering, there is no incentive for allowing generous costs for training community-based
committees and allowing them to make mistakes. Contracts have fixed prices and the con-
tractor bears the cost overruns if they occur. There were no new incentives developed in these
programs to encourage a new way of working.
The main incentive for local government and private sector providers to share their role
with communities is that central government financiers required this before awarding public
works funds. This was specified in all the programs studied. With the IDT CBPWP, the cen-
tral government/financiers required CBOs to be the sole formal implement agent/provider, and
39The impact of these views and professional discourses more broadly on institutional transformation in the con-
text of these public works programs is analyzed in more detail in Adato (2000).
54this was a powerful factor explaining why
there was de facto participation in these
projects. With respect to the other six pro-
grams, where there could be joint providers,
financiers did not give very specific criteria
with respect to the nature of community
participation and the type of training given
to support it, nor were directives for partici-
pation monitored. Specifying these criteria
and monitoring their implementation are nec-
essary because once professional providers
obtained funds, the incentives to promote
participation, particularly higher levels of
participation, were removed. Communities
may, of course, also decide to limit their
own participation to specific areas due to
opportunity costs or their own perceptions
of where their abilities to contribute lie.
A central issue, reflecting long-standing
debates on democracy, is whether com-
munity members have the qualifications to
carry out the specialized, requisite respon-
sibilities. In these projects, the questions
revolved around whether PSC members
had the skills to carry out planning, book-
keeping, purchasing, and managing trans-
port, personnel, and other tasks. Actual levels
of education and skills varied across the
projects, with higher capacity at Clan-
william, Murraysburg (in the CBO that
was excluded), Lutzville, Kylemore, and
Stellenbosch, and less in Khayelitsha and
Thembalethu.40 However, no formal or on-
the-job training was provided to build these
skills. At Khayelitsha, computer courses
were offered on the weekends, but not well
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Table 6.1 Factors limiting the roles of the project steering committees (PSCs), case-study projects
Factors limiting
PSC roles Lutzville Langa Khayelitsha Thembalethu Clanwilliam Murraysburg Kylemore Stellenbosch
Consultant/govt. views




Lack of technical 
capacity within com-
mittee; no training
Local politics and 
conflict





Lack of clarity as to 
what function 
should be
Note: Shading indicates the presence of factors limiting the roles of the PSCs.attended.41 Special weekend training work-
shops were designed for the PSC, but were
only given when the project was close to
completion.
The objectives of central government
financiers to promote community partici-
pation and empowerment—that community
members should develop new skills and gain
management experience—was not shared by
many professional providers on the proj-
ects. Where participation was appreciated, it
was with a different vision. For example,
when asked if the PSC assisted the project
in any way, the contractor at Khayelitsha
responded:
Right at the beginning of the contract
there were a lot of houses that were
built in the road reserve and we got
hold of the Project Steering Committee
and said listen we can’t build a road
unless the people move out and relo-
cate, and there they did a fair amount
of work. Because their job wouldn’t go
on unless they did that. So they did
their job there but up to a point, then
the job would just naturally run inward
[toward the contractor]. And yes we
called them for problems, but it was
more just to do the administrative part
of it because . . . they didn’t really add
value to the contract. I don’t think. 
You need them for the community 
sake . . . the thing runs it’s like a big
vicious wheel, it just runs by itself.
Then the Project Steering Committee,
they can’t really change the direction
that this whole thing is running
(interview).
The contractor was also critical of the
PSC, questioning their commitment to the
project, their failure to really learn and com-
municate the principles of labor-intensive
construction, their dwindling attendance at
meetings, and their failure to show up for
computer training classes. The vast gulf be-
tween perceptions of the contractor and the
PSC at Khayelitsha is illustrated in the con-
trast between the contractor’s comments
above, and those of PSC members, who ex-
pressed that the contractor “never wanted to
give people a sense of ownership and re-
sponsibility towards the project and the
process” and later that the “contractor is
clearly taking some part of our responsibili-
ties away.” This was in fact one explana-
tion why their enthusiasm for the project
waned and why some members left the
committee (interview, Khayelitsha PSC).
Their perspective on appropriate roles for
the committee also contrasts with that of the
contractor:
We should have been part of monitor-
ing the overall aspects of the project—
things like ordering, buying the mate-
rials and tools . . . even the CLOs
[Community Liaison Officers] were
never involved in such operations. We
do not even know as the PSC how
much was allocated to this project—we
do not know how much was actually
expected in this project, also if there is
any over-spending . . . all these are the
decisions that were taken in the forums
where the officials meet without us . . .
I don’t think even our local councilors
were part of such meetings (interview,
Khayelitsha PSC).
This influenced the committee’s view
not only of the contractor, but also the
committee’s opinion of provincial govern-
ment, which was the department responsible
for the project (though central government
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41We do not know the reasons, because the PSC did not mention these classes, and after the contractor did, we
were not able to re-contact the PSC to inquire. It would be worthwhile to understand why, given the committee’s
expressed desire for more managerial inclusion: whether it was insufficient interest, quality of the classes, time
or logistical constraints, or other factors.was the primary financier; as explained in
Chapter 2, the funds passed through the
province). One member remarked that “the
politicians/leadership usually say that they
govern according to the needs and views of
the people, but it is them who turn around
and not implement their own policies about
communities taking part in deciding what it
feels is good for them” (interview, Khaye-
litsha PSC). This is a case where financiers
share interests with beneficiaries but profes-
sional providers did not—at least with re-
spect to the empowerment goal. The interest
in building a good quality road was shared
among all parties.
Similar divides between the perspectives
of community committee members and pro-
fessionals were revealed at Thembalethu. In
this case committee members, including two
who were also employed as office workers,
were not trained in using the computers or
bookkeeping, and were not involved in fi-
nancial issues nor kept informed on substan-
tive issues. One of the partner consultants
explained the divide that needs to bridged in
the following terms:
You see we consultants are used to the
conventional way of working. We de-
sign, there’s a contractor that is respon-
sible, they are the communities or the
beneficiaries—they know nothing about
what is happening to the funds . . . They
are just asked to work and get salaries
at the end of the day and leave. Now
this situation is a new situation that
needs both parties, communities and
the consultants, to make a joint effort to
educate each other about the new pro-
cess because the whole process is new
to us. The whole process is new also to
the community because they were not
involved before. They were not partici-
pating, so they want to participate. At
the same time we consultants, we’re not
used to communities getting involved
in the administration of the project. . . .
[We’re] not used to accountability and
the community wanted some account-
ability from us, especially with finance
(interview, Manong Associates).
Asked whether he felt some of the questions
the community members asked were valid
ones, he replied:
Yes, absolutely. That’s why I said if I
have to be given such a project again in
the future I’d run it differently from the
way we ran that one . . . In the begin-
ning put the proper administration
mechanism to train them, let them run
with the whole thing. Make sure they
keep the books, but at the same time
the financial part of it we have a proper
control of it, you see. They know what
is happening with each and every cent,
but at the same time their access to fi-
nance doesn’t become that busy because
it’s difficult if you keep books, finance,
you can draw money and all these
things. There is a way of getting around
these things you know. But I will make
it a point that they know it’s transparent,
they know themselves what is happen-
ing to the money, but they don’t keep
the money (interview).
Community representatives were eventually
removed from the project following a con-
flict where the contractor was held hostage
over a dispute involving bonuses. This was
a case with a very high degree of political
conflict in the community (more detail is
given below), and a wide gulf between the
perspectives of the consultant engineers and
community members on the PSC. The Lutz-
ville case discussed in Chapter 5, on the other
hand, shows that community-based organi-
zations can play a productive role in man-
aging projects without strife and with good
performance outcomes.
There are two ways of responding to the
problem that community committee mem-
bers may not have technical skills to con-
tribute to project management. The first is
that they thus should not be involved in
management in the interest of efficiency (as
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studies). An alternative approach is to see
participatory development projects as oppor-
tunities to develop local capacities through
training and oversight. In the case of South
African public works projects, policy-
makers (with an implicit democratically ex-
pressed mandate from their constituents)
made community participation an objective,
an end as well as a means. If it remains so
policymakers must live with the tensions
inherent in the process and continue to ex-
plore creative methods to achieve multiple
objectives. One such method, for example,
is that suggested by the Thembalethu con-
sultant in the quote above. The extent to
which there is a tension between empower-
ment of communities and technical effi-
ciency varies on a case by case basis. But
policymakers need to make the prioritiza-
tion of objectives clear to the professional
and community-based providers, so each
party knows what to expect and what is ex-
pected of them.
It is not only the private sector that has
had difficulty adjusting to the idea of com-
munity participation. Local government was
often the main alternative to the commu-
nity-based provider, or the main partner in a
shared arrangement. In Murraysburg the
local government did not involve a CBO at
all until the proxy financier (DTPW) threat-
ened to withhold funds, and even then it
continued to resist bringing in the CBO. In
this case, the CBO had some leadership
with a high standard of education and could
have taken on management roles (they re-
ported having managed a R700,000 project
for the Department of Health). The local
CBO explained the situation as follows:
In as far as the CBPWP is concerned it
was made clear that the municipality
had to involve a community organiza-
tion and [we are] the only local com-
munity organization. [The municipality]
informed [DTPW] that there is a com-
munity organization and so the depart-
ment approached us. They came up
with a contract and we had to sign it
and say whether we approved or not.
We did not sign the contract because
we disagreed on a few things. When we
read through the contract we found that
we . . . had to be involved from the
start but we were only involved when
the project was already in the middle.
We found that they only wanted our
signatures and they were doing the
whole thing. . . . [For example] R74,000
was allocated for training. So we said
we will not sign the contract unless
they could prove that the R74,000
was spent for the right purpose. . . .
We did not sign the contract because
we wanted answers as to how the
monies were spent and they could not
come up with the answers . . . they re-
ally did not want to come out straight
and say we still have the money or
this money has been given. So we said
how can we sign because we will be
rubber-stamping something of which
we have no knowledge (interview,
Murraysburg CBO).
The organization attributed this to
the old idea that still persists that [the
government] decides for the people and
they just have to say thank you, and
they don’t ask questions. . . . The mu-
nicipality is also seeing [the CBO] as a
threat because if they are going to give
[the CBO] more of a say they will not
have the ability to do their own thing
without the people having a say. . . .
They still have that old attitude that
we decide for you and at the end of
the day you just accept (interview,
Murraysburg CBO).
Local government officials on the other
hand saw no reason to involve the CBO:
“Even today I can not see that with [the
CBO] involved, that anything could have
run better than the way it was” (interview,
local official).
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ticipation can also work well, and the bene-
fits that come from this. In Lutzville, the
Lutzville West Development Trust (a CBO)
was the provider/PSC, with its leader the
project manager. The PSC contracted an
architect (again a partial provider) but man-
aged the construction, labor force, and fi-
nances on its own, without any involvement
of the municipality and with occasional ad-
vice from consultants. The community hall
is of a high quality standard, and it came in
within the budget (a small overrun was made
up through interest). It was the first time the
community had managed a project, and com-
mittee members said they are “still shaken
up about this. [We] can’t believe that we did
this.” Their confidence had increased, and
they were “waiting anxiously for the next
[project]” (interview, Lutzville PSC). There
were expressions of similar feelings of ac-
complishment and new capacity (though
mixed with more frustrations) from PSC
members at Khayelitsha, Thembalethu, and
Clanwilliam. These are described in the
larger report upon which this research re-
port is based (Adato et al. 1999).
Participation, Politics,
and Conflict
Community participation is also complicated
by the introduction of local politics into proj-
ects, which often brings conflict and some-
times expensive delays. The politicization
of projects means that a process that is in-
tended to be inclusive and serve the interests
of beneficiaries, often excludes some part of
a community and serves the interests of some
intended beneficiaries more than others. In
some cases national level politics entered
the projects, particularly when a project was
known as an RDP project and community
members who were not working on the proj-
ect felt a sense of ownership. In an incident
in the Stellenbosch case study, workers had
joined a national work stay-away, but then
requested and were allowed to work on a
weekend day to make up their wages. Other
community members felt this ran contrary
to the purpose of the strike and arrived at the
project, insisting that the work be stopped.
More often, however, political conflict in
projects reflected local and provincial-level
politics. Political tensions are the reality of
working in communities where resources
are very scarce, where there are conflicts of
interest, and where a history of conflict
between communities and the state, and be-
tween workers and managers, re-emerges in
new forms in development projects.42 One
long-time Western Cape activist, who be-
came a specialist in community facilitation
and worked in public works projects, de-
scribed the Hout Bay CBPWP community
hall project, where
they wanted to politicize each and every
thing. After all, that is a community-
based project. The process designed to
let everybody get involved in it. At the
end the workers did shady work, the
standard was low, they didn’t listen to
the foreman. Everything just went hay-
wire . . . the whole idea was that the
community was going to empower
themselves. . . . And we had endless
problems with them. We had money
problems, that they wanted more money,
they wanted to change the design. . . .
I can give you a million examples . . .
There is so much friction in some of
these communities and everybody is
afraid to talk about it. Everybody still
believes that the struggle was a great
unifier, but they don’t understand we’re
not in the struggle anymore, we’re in
reality now and people have difference
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tion” in the apartheid and transitional era to “strategies of development” in a post-apartheid political and eco-
nomic context.of opinions. . . . It’s over resources, 
it’s over power43 (interview, C. B.
Associates).
According to another consultant, there
were many political groups involved and
some of those that felt excluded ended up
vandalizing the community hall. This is
another reason to facilitate an inclusive
process, although such facilitation was at-
tempted in this case and does not always
solve the problems.
Local politics affected projects in dif-
ferent ways in all eight cases studied, but had
a particularly strong impact in four. Local
politics involved conflict between political
parties, between CBOs and local govern-
ment, and among CBOs. The nature of the
problem affecting the PSCs were mainly
two: (1) Projects were used by political ri-
vals to gain political advantage, where one
group attempted to exclude another to avoid
sharing the credit for infrastructure delivery.
Once a group no longer perceived a political
gain, it lost its incentive to support the proj-
ect; (2) Local politics were carried inside the
projects, causing disruptions which under-
mined the effectiveness of the PSC and the
authority of its members. The case studies
provide insight into these processes and their
implications for community-based projects.
In Thembalethu, where community
members were on a joint PSC with consul-
tants and the contractor, political conflict
reached a point where the consultants said
they eventually found the need to exclude the
committee in order to get the job done. One
consultant said that the community commit-
tee members had their own agendas, were
too influenced by local political struggles,
changed their minds too often, and did not
stick to agreements. In one incident, they
called a strike that workers did not want,
and in another participated in holding the
contractor hostage over the issue of bonuses.
Thembalethu was a particularly difficult
community to work in, with a highly frac-
tious political environment, and many po-
litical groupings vying for influence (we
identified five, there may have been more).
The community committee members were
appointed from a trust with links to a sepa-
rate engineering firm, and not elected by the
community. In this sense, it was a particu-
larly complicated and atypical project, but
nevertheless illustrates the type of prob-
lems that can be encountered in community-
based projects.
Clanwilliam and Murraysburg were
towns with a common political configura-
tion in rural Western Cape, with National
Party (NP) and African National Congress
(ANC) members sitting together on a coun-
cil controlled by the NP, and a community-
based organization officially neutral but more
sympathetic to the ANC. In Clanwilliam,
when the RDP Forum took on a manage-
ment role, local government pulled back,
though in the end they were impressed:
“everyone was sort of standing on the side-
lines to see whether the thing would work
out. Everyone wanted to see where a mis-
take was going to be made, but in the end
they came to us and congratulated us” (in-
terview, local official, PSC). The municipal-
ity resisted involving the RDP Forum in the
administration of the project, until a greater
role for the forum was negotiated with the
assistance of provincial facilitators. Commu-
nity members and local government officials,
though they were not in a happy alliance,
did both participate substantively in imple-
mentation and performed their tasks well.
In Murraysburg, in addition to the munic-
ipality seeing delivery as its own job, there
was also a strained political relationship be-
tween itself and the local CBO, which re-
sulted in the latter dropping out of the proj-
60 CHAPTER 6
43There were of course differences of opinion in the anti-apartheid movement as well. But this speaker’s point is
that that the conflicts with authority and between political interests that became so familiar in the anti-apartheid
era were being brought into projects, where beneficiaries of the projects would stand to lose.ect altogether. The CBO’s perception was
that “some people in the municipality are
paying too much attention to politics at
the expense of the community” (interview,
Murraysburg CBO). Referring to these two
projects but also others in the province, one
of the provincial facilitators observed that
We need to be able to de-politicize the
projects and that is always a big prob-
lem in our country. How do you de-
politicize anything? [A project is] a
great political football in the ranks of 
a political party and also you know try-
ing to score points on the opposition
and that has also made it bloody diffi-
cult in some cases where National
Party and ANC people have also fought
(interview, C. B. Associates).
Both issues identified here—views on
technical expertise and local politics—
indicate the important role played by national
government financiers and their provincial
counterparts in setting and monitoring pro-
visions for community participation. In all
eight case study projects involvement of a
CBO was a requirement. In Clanwilliam,
where local government did not want to in-
volve RDP forum members in monitoring
of the funds, the provincial DTPW made a
difference:
Here it was again the issue of whether
[community] people could be trusted
and whether [we] had the experience.
They have a very low opinion of us.
For this to change we just had to put
our foot down and with the help of
[facilitation consultants hired by DTPW]
we gave them the option that either
you give us a say in the administration
of the funds or we will find a way to
administer the funds ourselves. The
municipality wanted to administer the
funds and only they will have full say
in this, but this was then sorted out
(interview, Clanwilliam PSC).
DTPW was less successful in Murrays-
burg. There, the CBO made the point that
it was the provincial department’s role to
make sure the requirements for community
participation were met: “unfortunately for us
the people who are supplying the money
are also negligent because they are not fol-
lowing up” (interview, Murraysburg CBO).
DTPW tried to insist on involvement of
the CBO by sending out its facilitators and
withholding funds, but eventually turned the
funds over after the municipality already
spent the money and built the asset (using
Housing Department funds that were ear-
marked for a different project and required
reimbursement). Returning to the model in
Chapter 4, these cases of politics and con-
flict illustrate where a provider or particular
provider arrangement is not working in the
best interest of beneficiaries. Instead, the fin-
ancier more closely served these interests
and intervened to do so.
The case studies also suggest that a
community with a high degree of political
fragmentation will introduce a higher de-
gree of conflict to a project, whereas a po-
litically homogenous community will see
a smoother participatory process. In some
cases this political conflict took on a racial
as well as political dimension; in others the
conflict was inter-party or intra-party. In
Clanwilliam and Murraysburg, political
tensions between the ANC and NP led to
competition and conflict. Lutzville West on
the other hand was a politically and racially
homogenous, tight knit community with a
large stock of social capital at the outset,
and little if any conflict. This project had
one of the highest levels of participation
among the 101 projects and was efficiently
managed and reasonably labor intensive.44
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average in efficiency in transferring money to the poor, and just below average with respect to labor intensity.These conditions cannot easily be influenced
by an external intervention, though media-
tion or authority given to a legitimate, down-
wardly accountable local government might
be able to soften or reduce the impact of pre-
existing conflicts or distrust.
However, fractionalization and conflict
do not necessarily prevent participation—it
may even increase it where rivals seek in-
fluence (this may have positive or negative
impacts on the project). In Clanwilliam there
was eventually a high degree of participa-
tion; in Murraysburg there was none. There
was also a high level of conflict (intra-party
rather than inter-party) in the Thembalethu
and Khayelitsha projects, but a high and
medium level (respectively) of participation.
However, the outcomes of conflict might be
otherwise problematic, as they were in the




There is a generalized belief that participa-
tion increases the time of project implemen-
tation. In five of our eight case study projects,
at least some informants commented that
community participation adds time to proj-
ects. This is usually true up front—decisions
made by community members or commit-
tees about project design, hiring, and other
issues are likely to take longer than those
made by government officials or consult-
ants, because of the time required for com-
munity members to understand the issues,
and the pressure for consensus. It is also
likely that politics and conflict will cause
delays. In the Khayelitsha and Thembalethu
projects, cost overruns were high, in part
attributed to community conflict. Different
conclusions were drawn from these experi-
ences. The lesson one official in the provin-
cial government came away with was that
community participation was too expensive
and there should be less of it. Similarly, the
contractor at Thembalethu felt that com-
munity participation takes too long, and that
from his standpoint conventional contracts
are easier to manage.
Yet while increased time would nor-
mally be associated with higher costs, the
quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 found
higher de facto participation to be more cost-
effective. The case study research provides
some insight into why this might be the
case. One part of this explanation revealed
in the case studies is that participation early
on avoids costly conflict and delays later.
In the Clanwilliam project, a key municipal
official felt that the strike there could have
been averted if there had been more com-
munity involvement in the project. Another
DTPW program director warned that trying
to avoid conflict or save time by sidelining
community members is unlikely to succeed,
since
If you don’t have community participa-
tion you run a large risk of having your
project blocked. To get a project done
on time you must get acceptance of the
project by community leadership, pro-
vide assurance that labor will come
from community, but also agreement
that some can come from outside. You
may spend a bit more up front in get-
ting this participation, but if you don’t
you may end up with project stopped
or having to bring people from outside
which costs more (interview).
In the case studies, we also found that
the pressure to get projects off the ground
quickly is at odds with the time needed to
adequately discuss issues with community
members and project workers before con-
struction starts. This may increase the
chances of a slipshod participation process
that goes awry. In the CBPWP, delays in
obtaining funds and other obstacles at the
early stages meant that once projects began
there was a rush to finish them within the
remaining time allotted. Also, where consul-
tants are the providers, there are usually high
62 CHAPTER 6capital costs and overheads, and set tender
prices that cannot be adjusted upwards, lead-
ing to pressure to not extend the time frame.
From an engineer’s point of view, a logistics
process has a “critical path” and there are in-
centives not to veer from this (interview, of-
ficial, DTPW)—another reason to deal with
problems early, before that path is embarked
upon. From the beneficiaries point of view,
however, there is no reason to rush—in fact,
a longer project means more employment—
and consensus is considered important.
These competing incentives must be me-
diated, particularly during the construction
phase (if workers slow down to extend the
project, which does occur). In politics de-
bates can continue indefinitely, and there
does need to be a process for facilitating
timely decisions, within a work plan.
There are also political decisions inher-
ent in what type of participation to pursue.
Under Paul’s (1987) four types of partici-
pation, time can be expected to increase
moving from type (1) to (4). Determining
the relative priority of efficiency and em-
powerment objectives is a policy process.
Politics, conflicts of interest, struggles over
resources and drawn-out processes of con-
sultation, consensus and even new consen-
sus post-conflict are part of the landscape
of community-driven development. Train-
ing, facilitation (by local government or
others), and patience are all required. If com-
munity empowerment remains an objective,
then all role-players must take the realiza-
tion of this objective seriously through allo-
cating the necessary training, time, and pa-
tience to see the process through. Our case
studies and quantitative analysis indicate
that there is not necessarily a trade-off be-
tween participation and efficiency.
Local Government 
and Representation
One basis for resistance to participation on
the part of some providers in local govern-
ment and the private sector was the belief
that local government was the representa-
tive of “the community”—they did not see
the need to involve a CBO. In Clanwilliam,
one local councillor asked:
if [the CBO] got involved, what role
did the Council have to play? Because
we were chosen by the community.
There was a clash of interest in my way
of thinking. [The CBO] got involved
on behalf of the community; we got in-
volved because the community made
their crosses behind our names. So why
would the one do a better job than the
other one? (interview).
The respective roles of local government
and CBOs and the relationship between
them is a salient issue in debates about de-
centralization and participation. Ribot (2001)
persuasively argues that local associations
(such as CBOs) do not necessarily represent
the public nor are they systematically ac-
countable, and that elected local government
is a legitimate representative of local peo-
ple. Different interest groups hold varying
degrees of power, and representative gov-
ernance levels the playing field. However,
he also recognizes the less than ideal op-
erationalization of decentralization to date.
Among other problems: powers are usually
placed with upwardly accountable agents
or with private groups who are not system-
atically accountable at the local level; and
there are many ways that local elite or polit-
ical parties are able to capture the electoral
process. Ribot also posits certain factors
that influence how accountable local gov-
ernment might be; for example, the ways in
which they are embedded in social relations
in their communities and the level of civic
dedication.
All of these points have considerable rel-
evance to the South African experiment with
community participation. There are many
arguments why local government rather than
CBOs should be the main provider in public
works projects—democratic accountability;
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spect to the complicated task of infrastruc-
ture delivery. Note that local government was
part of the joint provider arrangement in the
majority of the 101 projects. However, there
are also several factors that weigh in favor
of a strong role for CBOs in the South
African context. First, most of these CBOs
were elected. In the context of powerful
discourses of democracy leading up to and
following the transition to a democratic
state (Adato 1996), it is less likely that a
community committee with access to re-
sources could simply be appointed. Second,
when many of these programs started, a le-
gitimate local government was not in place.
But even when local elections did take place,
the observation that local governments can
end up being upwardly rather than down-
wardly accountable, controlled by elite or
political parties had relevance in Western
Cape province. In many of the communities
where our research took place, local gov-
ernments were embedded in social and po-
litical relations—in particular racial, class,
and political configurations left over from
apartheid—in a way that significantly re-
duced their downward accountability. Fi-
nally, in several of our case study com-
munities, local authorities represented dual
communities of different race and class, and
were more directly accountable to a non-
poor constituency. There is also the consid-
eration of the RDP, that aimed to build the
skills and capacities of local people through
their direct involvement (not through rep-
resentation) in development processes.
Nevertheless, in a more accountable
framework, the arguments are still strong
for elected local authorities to play the role
of provider in public works projects. Ribot
(2001) also makes a strong case for the im-
portant role that local associations can play
in fostering accountability through moni-
toring, informing, and lobbying. Capacity
for political action can be built this way (al-
though the acquisition of certain skills is
more questionable). The argument for local
government responsibility won out in the
subsequent CBPWP in South Africa, where
authority for implementation was placed
with local government. As the country’s
democracy grows older, local government
should become more accountable than it
was in the immediate post-apartheid envi-
ronment. Still, the history of civil society
participation at the local level may still re-




In five of the seven case study projects
where community-based committees were
involved, the commitment of members to
the job was reduced over the course of the
project. In four of the projects, committee
members explained that their interest dimin-
ished when their power was undermined.
However, other stakeholders observed that
committee members got busy and over-
extended, especially those with skills and
commitment to many community activities.
Their skills make them likely to have other
jobs as well as other community engage-
ments (a factor at Clanwilliam and Kyle-
more). Committee members, particularly
women, may have problems attending
meetings in the evening (although this was
not raised by any committee members). If
committee participation wanes or members
drop out, implementing agents and consul-
tants should try to learn why; what are the
constraints they face in terms of time or
foregone opportunities? What dissatisfaction
might they have with the process? Compen-
sation for serving on committees can also be
considered. This involves risks, because it
increases the chance that people will try to
get on the committee for money rather than
commitment to the project, and the likeli-
hood of conflict as people vie for member-
ship in the context of high unemployment.
In Lutzville, the project was carried off
successfully and with sustained commitment
without any compensation. In Khayelitsha,
attendance problems were solved by paying
64 CHAPTER 6members a stipend to attend meetings—
probably a better option than paying a flat
salary because the amount is small and the
stakes lower. Also, if a PSC member is es-
sentially an employee of the provider (in-
cluding possibly itself), its independence
as a worker representative is potentially
comprised.
Lack of Clarity in the
Role of the PSC
Given the joint provider institutional ar-
rangements of most of these public works
programs, and the ambivalence of many
project stakeholders about the role of CBOs
in project management, there was a signifi-
cant degree of confusion in many of the
projects as to what the role of the PSC was
supposed to be. For example, in Khayelitsha
it emerged that the PSC’s main de facto
role was as community liaison and worker-
management liaison, but this was also the
role of the two elected Community Liaison
Officers (CLOs), as well as a role occasion-
ally and most effectively played by the local
government.
The two Fynbos Working for Water case
study projects provide particularly colorful
examples of this problem. The national level
financier, the Department of Water Affairs
and Forestry (DWAF) specified that all proj-
ects would have Facilitating Committees
composed of local government, an RDP
Forum, the Workers Committee, and some-
times other CBOs. However, in the two case
study projects the composition of the com-
mittee was different. At Kylemore it was
composed of assorted community members
whom the project manager requested to join,
skilled people who were active in commu-
nity affairs. In Stellenbosch, it consisted of
local councilors and initially RDP forum
members. In both cases (1) the roles were not
clearly defined; (2) there were conflicting
perceptions of these roles by the committee
members themselves and project manage-
ment; and (3) their participation dwindled,
in part because of (1) and (2) above. There
were also other reasons, for example, in
Kylemore the members had too many other
commitments.
DWAF envisioned the steering commit-
tee as assisting with “recruitment, appoint-
ments, promotions; disputes between the
community and Fynbos Water Conservation
Programme; discipline, facilitation of com-
munity tendering, and promoting social
activities” (SALDRU/IFPRI project survey).
Other functions were seen as “advising us
on social questions in the community” and
this and discipline were the committee roles
seen as most useful by project implementers
(interview, DWAF official). Steering com-
mittees were functioning to greater or lesser
degrees across the FWWPprojects, but in the
two projects in our study, they were hardly
functioning at all. The committees were more
active in the early stages, but this had waned
for the reasons cited here. In both cases, the
committees did not want to be brought in
only to deal with labor conflicts. They did
not want to be seen by workers as just a
disciplinary body (reported at Kylemore) and
felt that they did not know enough about the
project and working conditions to feel com-
fortable in that role (reported at Stellen-
bosch). In Kylemore, they also felt uncom-
fortable in a social worker role:
We can advise that the social worker
must work there or the supervisor must
try to do that or so on, but we cannot
be physically involved and I think they
thought that the steering committee
could take a lot of their responsibility
which is not working now. . . . So they
should have thought about the things
that are going to happen in the project
and work out protocols, how we’re
going to handle some of these issues
(interview, Facilitating Committee,
Kylemore).
Increasingly, the committee felt that the
manager, who tended to want to control most
aspects of the project herself, saw the com-
mittee as an interloper, eventually excluding
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mittee was even less clear about its role.
Let me tell you, we don’t actual know
what is the whole objective of the
Steering Committee. If we don’t have
functions, so we don’t know what’s
our function. We cannot tell you what
people want from the steering commit-
tee (interview, Facilitating Committee,
Stellenbosch).
Committee members felt that they should
be monitoring the project and reporting back
to the community, but were too uninvolved
to know what to report back. Subsequently,
the committee played no role, and did not
know why it was no longer called to meet-
ings. There was a need to revisit and re-
define the role of the steering committees
in these projects, which DWAF did under-
take. Given that the WWP was operating
at an increasingly large scale, introducing
many new economic and social develop-
ment measures rapidly, it was particularly
important that experimental institutional
arrangements were monitored, so that other-
wise good program ideas were not under-
mined by problems going undetected and
unsolved.
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Conclusions
F
or several decades, development theory and practice has increasingly called for greater
participation of local people and community organizations in the initiation, design, and
implementation of development initiatives that directly affect their communities. This
call has philosophical, political, and instrumentalist underpinnings. There has been an in-
creasing recognition that top-down, technocratic forms of development imposed on diverse
local realities often result in failure; that local people best understand their own needs and
what is likely to work and not work; that involving local people can be cost-effective in terms
of reduced capital costs, and increased involvement in operation and maintenance, and thus
greater sustainability; and finally, that poor people should have more power to direct the
course of their own economic and social development.
These ideas have not been lost on South Africa. In fact, the last point infuses much South
African development policy. In terms of different levels of participation—information sharing,
consultation, decisionmaking, and initiating action—the NPWP aimed to achieve all of these.
In fact, by making community capacity building one of its central objectives, the NPWP saw
participation in part as an “end” in itself. But it can and, from a political economy perspective,
must simultaneously be a “means” of efficient infrastructure delivery if it is to survive as
a policy. Although the goals of participation as an end and as a means to other ends can be
complementary, there are various tensions in this relationship.
The case studies pointed to ways in which participation, through wide community forums or
through CBOs, added value to projects through enabling beneficiary communities to influence
the choices of priority assets and by contributing to project design features that can increase
safety and convenience, and affect the number of jobs created in the short and long term. Reg-
ular communication with communities can increase a sense of local ownership with various
positive spin-offs such as more cooperation and better maintenance. Yet community partici-
pation also introduces politics, conflict, and lengthier decisionmaking processes, increasing
the time required up front. On the other hand, forgoing participation can result in even more
conflict and time required further down the line when time becomes more expensive.
The quantitative work demonstrates that even after accounting for the endogeneity of
participation, de facto participation has a statistically significant, positive effect on the project
budget share spent on labor, the log number of days of work created, and the log number
of training days undertaken. It increases the percentage of employment that goes to women
and is associated with a reduction in the ratio of the project wage to local unskilled wages. It
reduces the cost of creating employment and reduces the cost of transferring income to the
poor. The magnitudes of these impacts are sizeable and they are robust to a variety of model
specifications and the inclusion of other covariates.
67Despite these benefits from participa-
tion, the qualitative research found a wide
gap between ideas for community-driven
projects embodied in national government
policies and programs and the beliefs and
practices of professional providers at the
provincial and local levels, in government
and the private sector. Although there is a
voiced consensus on the importance of
community participation, there is profound
ambivalence about it, as well as widely dif-
ferent ideas about what it means and where
it is appropriate.
Community-based PSCs were involved
in some way in almost all projects but their
roles tended to be limited to community and
worker liaison functions. These liaison func-
tions are important to the community and
useful for contractors, but far more limited
than the vision of the NPWP, where the com-
munity “through its representative commu-
nity structure, should make the decisions
about what should be constructed, how it
should be designed and constructed, who
should work on the project, as well as the
rates and system of employment (DPW
1996, 38). In many projects, consultants or
local government excluded PSCs from par-
ticipation in management tasks because of
professional views about efficiency and spe-
cialization, and a lack of identification with
the program objectives of capacity building
and empowerment. PSC members in some
projects did not have sufficient skills, and
were not trained. There were other problems
that limited participation too: local politics,
dwindling commitment of PSC members,
and unclear role assignments.
There are two ways of responding to
these findings. One is to substantially re-
duce the role of communities, providing op-
portunities for communication and in some
areas consultation. Local government, if it is
legitimate and downwardly accountable to
poor constituents/public works beneficiaries,
could be the sole provider. Alternatively,
government could increase its commitment
to improving structures and processes for
community participation for the value that
it adds. In the same way that Ribot (2001,
342) suggests that the “ ‘democratic’decen-
tralization experiment has not yet happened,”
it can be argued that the community partici-
pation experiment, in the way envisioned
by the RDP and NPWP, has hardly occurred.
Certainly the first phase of community-based
public works programs involved severe
growing pains, and subsequent participa-
tory programs have still not solved all these
problems.
Community participation in its pure
forms envisioned by the government in 1994
may not necessarily be the most appropri-
ate path under newer political structures
and relationships. Participation does not
have to be all or nothing, and its best forms
are likely to vary under different circum-
stances.45 There are a range of modalities
for capturing local preferences and through
which to achieve accountability, trans-
parency, capacity building, and local em-
powerment, while delivering quality infra-
structure needed by the poor. Debates about
prioritization of objectives and how to
achieve them must take place among policy-
makers and their constituencies, and then
decisions reflected in program design. If
participation and local empowerment re-
main important objectives—and it is likely
that they will if differently conceived—
policymakers and program designers must
explore creatively institutional arrangements
and methods for increasing skills and ca-
pacities. This might include a primary role
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45Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) argue that the quest for “one solution” is the problem. While they mainly point
to the problems with uniform imported technocratic and bureaucratic systems, they suggest that calls for partici-
pation and empowerment be regarded with analytical complexity as well, advocating for local solutions to local
problems. They also note that tensions between the interests and incentives of all involved can be seen as an op-
portunity to enhance creative solutions.for legitimate downwardly accountable
local authorities (as has been the intention
for new community-based public works
programs). But new policy proposals alone
are unlikely to bring about significant
change. This would require that all impor-
tant stakeholders be brought into the pro-
cess, common ground found, and a commit-
ment generated to carry out and monitor
agreements. This would also require provid-
ing the time and training necessary to oper-
ationalize agreed roles.
The Lutzville community hall project
where a CBO managed all aspects of a highly
successful project—meeting cost, quality,
training, and capacity building objectives—
is an example of the feasibility of capable
community-based project management. On
the other hand, not all communities will have
the social and political conditions of Lutz-
ville West, so the road will not always be so
smooth. Nevertheless, politics, conflicts
of interest, struggles over resources, and
processes of consultation and consensus-
building are part of the landscape of com-
munity-based development. If participatory
development remains part of South Africa’s
development agenda, then all role-players
must take the realization of this objective
seriously through providing the necessary
resources, creativity, and patience to see the
process through.
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